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EDITORIAL

THE grave words on the European outlook uttered last month by the Archbishop of Canterbury call us to consider some of the underlying causes for the ebbing of confidence in the League of Nations; and it is possible that, though the symptoms are serious, diagnosis may not be wholly discouraging. One of the principal events which has shaken confidence in the League has been its failure to intervene effectively in the Far East; and we suggest that the primary cause of this failure was that one of the assumptions on which the League has hitherto rested has proved fallacious. That assumption was that every nation enrolled in the League was *compos sui*. It was an inevitable assumption, perhaps, when the League came into being: but the example of China has shown that it cannot be sustained. Nor is the case of China likely to remain isolated. The cause of the present European difficulties is the quite legitimate fear that Germany may hitch its wagon to Hitler's wayward star. Wherever, in fact, what Plato called "unmixed democracy" holds sway, there you have a centre of instability and unreason; and those things are far more often than ambition the cause of war.

It is for statesmen to deal with the problem so created for the League. It may well be found that settlement can only come to Europe through the restoration of a monarchy in Germany; just as the establishment of a monarchy in Manchuria, puppet-state though it be for the time being, may prove the first step towards the eventual pacification of China. The Church, however, has its own witness to give in another direction. Fear of one kind or another lies at the bottom of the world's *malaise*; and the source of fear is the Devil. The Church's task is to unmask his wiles, and in the whole armour of God to join in the never-ceasing warfare between His kingdom and Christ's. All Saints' Day commemorates those who devoted their lives to this supernatural conflict. It may well govern our thoughts throughout the Armistice-tide which will follow it.

THE THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY*

In logic it may be possible to trace out the implications of a proposition without any great concern whether that proposition is true or false. But the discovery of theological implications in a system of morality that could not make good its claim to validity would be only a hollow jest; our first and immediate task must therefore be to offer reasons for regarding moral facts as data to be taken account of no less than physical or biological facts in any attempted synoptic view of the universe.

Now physical and biological facts may or may not have theological implications. It may or it may not be legitimate to argue along the lines of the cosmological and teleological arguments, either in their traditional or revised forms, to the existence of God. Again, the argument from our thought of a Perfect Being to the existence of a Perfect Being may or may not hold good. But the attack upon these arguments usually takes the form of exposure of flaws in their reasoning rather than denial of the facts on which they are based.

With moral arguments the case is different. Here the relevance of our moral consciousness to the determination of the ultimate nature of the universe is insistently questioned. The systems of morality that the world has seen are many and various: some are systems of positive law; some propose an end, whether in definite form, as "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," or vaguely as τὸ εὖ ζῆν; some stress the importance of motives, others of consequences. All, however, agree in claiming certain types of conduct as having greater value or worth than other types. But particularly in modern times there have been attempts to cut away the very basis for such valuation by exhibiting all human behaviour as outside conscious control. Certain schools of psychology are especially concerned in this, and the implications of morality cannot rightly be considered until morality itself be vindicated.

The facts of man's moral consciousness to be taken into account are both his actually performed moral acts and his moral standards. The latter may be reckoned as fact owing to the impossibility of giving an adequate and coherent account of persons without reference to their aspirations as well as to their condition at a given moment.

Now psychology, as a descriptive science, investigates, among other things, moral action: it explores its processes and

* Being the Ellerton Prize Essay for 1932.

mechanism like those of any other kind of behaviour. It also traces the setting up, for the individual or race, consciousness of moral ideals. But in neither case does it make a value-judgment; it does not approve or disapprove the acts it describes; nor does it discriminate as to the worth of moral standards.

So far it may seem that psychology avoids challenging the validity of morals. But we assign worth to actions with regard to their motives, not to their consequences. [If the latter were true, acts approved by this criterion might find a place among the facts at the basis of a teleological argument for theism; in other words, it might be maintained that the frequent bringing about by human beings of effects conducive to some good end pointed to an all-wise Designer; but it would not be an argument from the morality of the actions, since its cogency would be unaffected whether the agent were self-determining or no.] Now if motive is the criterion of the morality of actions, some sort of spontaneity in human beings must be involved. If, then, psychology in its investigations should find no trace of spontaneity, moral values fall to the ground.

As a matter of fact, the conclusions reached by psychologists on this point will be determined by the assumptions with which they start.

First among schools of psychology let us consider the behaviourists. One of this school will restrict the data he works on, making them not essentially different from those of physiology. In the case of each action, he will discover the external stimulus communicated by the nerves to the brain, and the reverse journey through the nerves to some outlet in the visible body. Usually he will find these; always he will be confident that he could find them given greater opportunity. Spontaneity, he will say, he never meets; but that is because his initial assumption precludes him from meeting it. To keep to this assumption, in hard cases where the physical stimulus is not apparent, he has recourse to a kind of faith, to a belief that the sort of explanation he is looking for could be obtained were his knowledge greater. His denial of spontaneity, then, is antecedent to and not derived from his study of psychology, and need carry no weight.

But most psychologists are not rigid behaviourists. They deal with instincts and emotions, with sentiments and complexes; and they would be unable to detect these in others or to make any general laws about them without the help of their own subjective experience. The conclusions they reach may be fatal to human self-determination, but in reaching them the appeal to the subjective has been used. Now self-consciousness indeed

represents to us much of our behaviour as habit, as governed by the laws of association; but some of our behaviour, what we meaningfully call our actions, it decisively declares to be due to our own initiative.

Of course, the given in self-consciousness cannot be taken at its face-value. Perhaps this appearance of spontaneity may turn out to be so flatly in contradiction to all the rest of our knowledge as to be incapable of being fitted into a coherent scheme, and may have to be abandoned as an illusion. But it should at least be admitted among the data. And, as we have seen, the witness to be brought against the testimony of self-consciousness is a by no means independent witness. If observed behaviour is to be pitted against personal experience on the side of determinism against freedom, it will not be a conflict of objective with subjective, for subjectivity has been found to infect the account of behaviour. So arguments emphasizing the part played, in the determination of human behaviour, by the physical organism and environment cannot be taken as sufficient to make spontaneity impossible, before the consideration of morality is so much as begun.

Some schools of psychology, however, urge that man's behaviour is determined, not indeed by external stimuli, but by forces within, which equally are outside his control. The subconscious self is something of which he is unaware, and he is at its mercy. One school detects in all human conduct the promptings of the mighty force of sex, even where this urge is not patent; another attributes all to the "libido," or life-force; while another puts all down to the account of our fundamental self-assertiveness. Acts are robbed of their moral colouring by being exhibited as the inevitable outcome of instinctive processes long at work.

The conclusion seems inescapable so long as we confine our attention to momentary situations. The habitual inebriate sees a public-house; to prove that it is not within his power to refuse to enter seems easy. But how is it that he is an habitual inebriate? Was moral responsibility wholly absent from the course of events by which he became one? Again it is said, "the 'libido,' not the individual, determines." Perhaps; but the "libido" is capable of ten million forms. It can drive one man to a life of hardship, another to one of unbounded luxury. And both sex and self-assertiveness, when interpreted by their respective exponents as the basic impulses for all conduct, prove equally multiform. If the "libido" be so plastic, it cannot be the "libido" itself which moulds conduct; and similarly in the other two cases. Room is thus left for the free self-determination of the individual.

Enough has now perhaps been said for us to consider the question, "How do we know what we ought to do?" without being arrested by the objection that psychology has rendered the word "ought" meaningless.

Systems of morality are various, and it cannot be assumed that the theological implications of each will be the same. By some morality is said to be a kind of feeling or sensibility. In a given situation a man is supplied, through possessing a conscience, with an immediate knowledge of what ought to be done in the particular circumstances, and this knowledge cannot be gainsaid. The implication of this doctrine of morality seems fairly obvious. That a man should possess such a moral sense would be so remarkable a thing, that it could hardly be accounted for by anything less than the action of a Creator, desirous of having a special method of direct communication with His creatures. But of course this account of morality is beset with innumerable and serious objections.

Others conceive our actions as directed towards an end, and by conduciveness to that end, whatever it may be, they determine the value of single acts. Thus, at a certain moment of time, a man will not see two possible acts, one simply right and the other simply wrong, but he will have to make up his mind, by a process of calculation, which to a greater degree than the other will help him to reach the *τέλος* which he is aiming at. The whole significance of such systems of morality is thus lodged in the proposed end, in what is asserted to be "the good for man." All kinds of ends have been set forth, varying as the poles: *ἀνταρκεία* or *ἀταραξία*; self-annihilation or self-realization; the individual's own pleasure or the welfare of the community (large or small) to which he belongs. These ends have perhaps one characteristic in common: they mutilate the moral life, or at any rate emphasize one aspect of it exclusively. Thus patently pleasure, while it may allow for some benevolent actions, is an aim which much conduct, on which we habitually place the highest valuation, cannot subserve; and, after all, it is the business of moral philosophy to describe morality and not to make it; with Aristotle, we may be content to appeal to received opinions. The good of a community seems something far different. But even such an end does not really cover "the whole duty of man." If we think that a man may not help his native land or even the human race itself by fraud or forgery, "the good of the State," "the welfare of the race," "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" are insufficient descriptions of "the good for man."

Sometimes the end is described in a way free from these objections; as when it is said to be *εὐδαιμονία* or *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*.

In this case the difficulty, however, is that the end is so vaguely conceived that it cannot be used to determine action in concrete situations. And indeed Aristotle, who speaks of the end as *eὐδαιμονία*, gives an account of the moral life mainly in terms of virtues, which are means between excesses and defects, and which ultimately are unrelated to each other or to the end.

Those who have viewed morality as directed towards an end have not on the whole been particularly interested in the theological implications of their theories; often they have not been theists. Nevertheless a scrutiny of their positions which reveals contradictions in their proposed ends may show that something transcending mere morality is presupposed even in these views. We may be led to suspect that what are called "ends" are not final in the sense of closing the door to speculation.

Self-sufficiency was regarded by the Stoics as the end. The philosopher should be able to wrap himself in his cloak and, in detachment from worldly circumstances, practise virtue and be satisfied with his communings with himself. But it is of the essence of virtue to require other persons and things as the *media* of its realization, and the self-communings of a person, who neither has nor has had in the past commerce and intercourse with an outside world, are bound to be merely blank.

Again, if the end is proclaimed to be "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," a contradiction is implicit in the formula. Doubtless there are many courses of action which at one and the same time bring much happiness to many people, and this fact was likely to be in the foreground of the consciousness of Jeremy Bentham, whose legislative reforms were conspicuous examples of the advancement of this diffused happiness. But most types of action in proportion as they increase intensity of happiness do not in fact communicate it to larger numbers. It might actually be asserted that the greatest happiness of one man is the only intelligible and unambiguous end. This will be true enough if we confine our attention to the goods which promote external well-being and which can be somehow measured quantitatively. And indeed we are necessarily so limited by the formula, which is dominated by the thought of quantity. This tendency to inconsistency in descriptions of the end which attempt precision has been indicated in these two instances, and might be shown up in the cases of others as well. The implication seems to be that man's true goal is not any of these well-defined "ends"; that something more dimly apprehended but richer in content should be substituted. For if communion with an abiding Personality were

discovered to be a more adequate way of conceiving the τέλος of man, therein would be found the possibility for a dependence which not the αὐταρκής himself could find degrading, and a wealth of good, remaining quite unaffected by questions of "nicely calculated less or more."

Besides those ethical systems which we have mentioned, there are those that conceive of morality as obedience to laws or a law. Historically these laws—for example, the Decalogue—have been regarded as divinely promulgated. But this fact is irrelevant to our purpose. For if the laws depend upon the will of God, the reality of God cannot be argued from the laws and must be supported by considerations other than moral ones. Plato has shown at the beginning of the *Republic* how unsatisfactory to the intellect most simple rules of morality are, even those that work fairly well in practice. Thus the formulation, "One should render to every man his due," breaks down over the all-important question of what is due to the bad.

The rules may be regarded either as grasped by intuition as self-evidently true, and the application to particular situations made by syllogism with the rule as major premiss; or they may be thought of as the dictates of pure Reason, by means of which can be constructed a purely rational order of things, a "realm of ends," which it is the individual's duty to attempt, however fragmentarily, to bring into being.

In the first case, any rule which is to give guidance in definite cases is sure to prove to be "material," that is, it will be seen that it could not possibly have been arrived at without moral judgments in particular instances having already been made, and that it cannot therefore really be that which determines all particular moral judgments. On the other hand, Kant's principle that the criterion of duty is possible universalization is free from the empirical element, but is so formal as to be inapplicable to the detail of life.

But moral laws, in whatever shape they are presented, so long as they are conceived as unconditionally binding, raise questions that lead to theology. No doubt, if they are thought of as merely hypothetical imperatives, such consequences do not follow; but in that case, they have really become rules of convenience in one of the philosophies that concentrate upon an "end." The question must arise, "What makes the law so unalterably binding?" While some persons, such as Kant himself, have perceived such overwhelming majesty in moral law in itself that further questioning has seemed to them an impertinence, it is not the common experience of mankind to feel awe and respect for anything so abstract as a law, but only for persons. This suggests that the devotion which moral law

is capable of arousing is really directed towards and evoked by an unseen, personal Imponent of that law.

Important points open to criticism have been found in the ethical systems we have hitherto mentioned. Possibly it will be found more satisfactory to consider that a real (though not an infallible) moral judgment is made in the particular situation, and that laws are arrived at inductively from a number of these particular judgments. Of course, being the result of induction, these laws will not be exempt from emendation. In fact, they will have to be continually modified and expanded as our experience of life grows. Our rudimentary moral judgments may seem to be bafflingly contradictory, but in two very discrepant judgments an underlying element of unity can probably be discovered and used in the formulation of a law that embraces both. And in a similar manner, conflicting systems of moral judgments may be harmonized. Comprehensiveness will thus be the criterion of any view of morality: before a truly comprehensive view an apparently contrary judgment in a particular instance must give way; but no view can be held to be, as it stands, inclusive and final, for it may have to be superseded (yet not annulled).

According to all the types of moral philosophy that have been referred to, some kind of worth has been assigned to actions and lines of conduct, either in themselves or as leading to some end judged valuable, or as exemplifications of some law or system. But recognition of the worth of a state of affairs does not mean, as we know too well from experience, that it can immediately be brought into being. Yet things only have value as existing, or at least as supposed to be in existence; the mere concept of a thing that was inherently impossible could have no value, for value carries with it a claim to realization.* The tremendous difficulties that natural circumstances so often place in the way of the performance of duty make us ask whether the universe is so constructed as to corroborate our moral valuations or no. In an impressive passage Lord Balfour has described how the cosmic process shatters and removes all things that humanity prizes most highly. We feel bound to ask what is the rationale of moral action, if a character slowly and painfully built up is speedily and irrevocably dissolved. This is not a crude enquiry after a reward; it is no more than a

* These remarks may seem to be in contradiction to Kant's dictum that nothing is absolutely good except the good will. This assertion is of course true; indeed it is profoundly true. Yet a will cannot be judged good or bad except in so far as it is determined by something. To say that it should be determined by principle and not by inclination is not enough. It must discover value in things or situations to become valuable itself. But the truth of Kant's dictum does not stand or fall with the acceptance of his formulations of the categorical imperative as the determinants of value.

desire for an assurance that our moral valuations (whether at the stage of immediate awareness or as an elaborated system) are not simply our projection upon the universe, are not our merely subjective preferences, but are firmly lodged within the structure of the Real, and that in attempting to pursue them we are not blindly seeking to bring about a state of affairs which our knowledge on the theoretical side informs us to be completely unrealizable. This, of course, is not necessarily a demand that the workings of physical nature should be found to have a direct connection with the production of moral values; that consequence would follow only if the physical universe were self-subsistent, and if to be real meant merely to be included in its system. But if physical nature be dependent on a Power and Personality behind and beyond it, such teleological adaptations may or may not be discovered in its processes; the reality of moral values would not stand or fall by the discovery. Not the cosmic process but an intelligent and purposeful Personality being the *ens realissimum*, such a one can be relied upon, when and in what ways He will, to bring into harmony the order of existence and the moral order. Nothing less than the hypothesis of a God, thus personal, seems adequate to bridge the gulf between what ideally should be and what in fact is. If, then, we hold that morality makes an inexorable claim upon us, and if we do not wish to appear merely irrational in admitting the claim, the intellectual consequence of holding this practical faith will be to affirm the existence of a Being with both intelligence and will, whom we may fitly call God.

This type of approach to theism has been much criticized from the side of religion on the ground that making belief in God dependent not on the natural order as such, nor on the moral order as such, but simply upon the accident of their incompatibility, it leaves God in an external relation to both orders, and does not establish Him either as the imponent of obligation or as a worthy recipient of worship. Nevertheless a Being with both intelligence and will is postulated, since He must show intelligence in comprehending the unconditional character of morality, and will in desiring that goodness be not finally defeated, and to say of a being that He has both these qualities is tantamount to saying that He has personality. The harmony which He brings about between morality and the media wherein it has to find realization will not be merely accidental, for it will be the expression of His character. Moreover, if along the foregoing line of argument we have been led to acknowledge the existence of a personal God, His existence cannot fail to throw a new light upon, give a different tone to, our moral perceptions. If it was reflection upon the conse-

quences of accepting the validity of what we received in the moral consciousness that caused us to affirm the existence of God, this by no means rules out the detection of the voice of a Law-giver in the moral consciousness itself. It was only Kant's extreme jealousy for the autonomy of the will that prevented him from admitting unequivocally that reverence for moral law is really and implicitly reverence for divine personality. But to believe that the imponent of the moral law is a God, who is goodness itself, is a far different thing from the heteronomy that Kant was guarding against: views that made obligatory what might be arbitrary and capricious, such as the will of another human being. But what is revealed in conscience to me is *ex hypothesi* wholeheartedly accepted; I will it: in this sense there is no heteronomy. There is, however, notoriously our baffling inability to live up to the highest we know: with this fact the doctrine of the autonomy of the will is in difficulties, and Kant can only make a distinction between a man's higher and lower natures. Now this distinction is not at all satisfying: for an appeal to our experience of life assures us that our higher nature, ourselves as practical reason, is not exempt from contamination by the lower nature, that complete moral insight is not ours *ab initio*, but its growth depends upon our faithfulness at each step to the amount of insight that we have. And it is only for a completely moralized reason that we can have unqualified reverence. So the most that can be said of my self-determination is that it is an indispensable condition of true moral action that I should fully will it. What I will, however, must be in conformity with the will of God.

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(To be concluded.)

THE CROSS IN ST. LUKE'S GOSPEL

A STUDY IN HIS EDITING OF MARK

It is becoming increasingly recognized by students of the Synoptic Gospels that one of Matthew's and Luke's editorial habits is to soften and mitigate the terrible isolation of the Christ in Mark. This has been emphasized by Sir E. Hoskyns and Mr. Davey in *The Riddle of the New Testament*. "There is," they write, "misunderstanding to be detected in the Matthæan-Lucan editing of Mark. In the Marcan Gospel Jesus is isolated and wholly misunderstood, not only by the crowds and by the Jewish authorities, but also by His own family and kindred,

and by his chosen disciples. In Mark this is of vital importance because it is precisely in His complete humiliation and isolation that the revelation of God takes place. The salvation of man is wrought out as an *opus operatum* by Jesus in complete isolation. The gulf which separates Jesus from the Jews is hardly greater than the gulf which separates Him from His disciples. Both the editors are unable to force this through with the staggering brutality of Mark" (p. 137). The study of the many ways in which Matthew and Luke soften the isolation of Christ provides a big field for students of the Synoptic Gospels. And the present essay will consider two small parts of the field—the relation between Jesus and the people, and the death of Jesus, as treated by Mark and by Luke. The two subjects will be considered in close connection. It will not be maintained that Luke "misunderstood" Mark, but rather that while he interprets the fact of the Cross as a Christian theologian he yet misses the horror, scandal, and unintelligibility of the Cross which confront us in the pages of Mark. On this critical study there will be based some reflections on theology and Christian teaching. The Church must teach both the Lucan and the Marcan vision of the Cross.

JESUS AND THE PEOPLE

We will first consider, especially in connection with the Cross, the relation between Jesus and the common people. Luke is interested in crowds. In editing his Marcan source he adds many references to the presence of a crowd (*cf.* Luke iii. 7, 15, 21; v. 15; xii. 1; xviii. 43; xix. 37; xx. 45). With his psychological bent he is interested in what the crowds are thinking, and he draws out two points in particular. (1) The popularity of Jesus with the people (Luke iv. 15; viii. 40; ix. 43; xviii. 43; xix. 37, 48; xx. 6; xx. 26; xxii. 2, 6; xxiii. 48); (2) the bitter opposition of the religious leaders (Luke xix. 38; vi. 11; xi. 54). Both these points are stressed again and again by small editorial additions to the Marcan source, and these editorial verses add a dramatic tone to the narrative. Sometimes the two facts are brought into dramatic contrast.

Luke xi. 53 to xii. 1 : And when he was come out from thence, the scribes and the Pharisees began to press upon him vehemently, and to provoke him to speak of many things, laying wait for him to catch something out of his mouth.

In the meantime when the many thousands of the multitude were gathered together, insomuch that they trode one upon another, he began to say . . .

Luke xix. 37 : And as he was drawing nigh, even at the descent of the Mount of Olives, the whole multitude of the disciples began to rejoice and praise God with a loud voice for all the mighty works they had seen . . . and some of the Pharisees from the multitude said unto him, Master, rebuke thy disciples.

This contrast, between the people who hearken to Jesus and the leaders who oppose him, is specially drawn out in the Lucan narrative of Holy Week and Good Friday, sometimes by slight editorial additions to the Marcan source.

Mark xi. 18 : And the chief priests and the scribes heard it, and sought how they might destroy him, . . . for all the multitude were astonished at his teaching.

Mark xi. 32 : But should we say, From men—they feared the people.

Mark xii. 1 : And he spake unto them in parables. A man planted a vineyard.

Mark xii. 38 : And in his teaching he said, Beware of the scribes.

Mark xiv. 11 : And he sought how he might conveniently deliver him unto them.

Luke xix. 47 : But the chief priests and the scribes and the principal men of the people sought to destroy him, *and they could not find what they might do, for all the people upon him listening.*

Luke xx. 6 : But if we shall say, From men—*all the people will stone us.*

Luke xx. 9 : And he began to speak *unto the people* this parable. A man planted a vineyard.

Luke xx. 20 : And they watched him and sent forth spies, which feigned themselves to be righteous, that they might take hold of his speech.

Luke xx. 26 : *And they were not able to take hold of the saying before the people (i.e., Luke puts the controversy about tribute to Cæsar in the atmosphere of a conflict for the sympathies of the people).*

Luke xx. 45 : *And in the hearing of all the people* he said unto his disciples, Beware of the scribes.

Luke xxii. 6 : And he consented and sought opportunity to deliver him unto them *in the absence of the multitude.*

So a conflict has raged for the allegiance of "the people," and "the people" adhere to Jesus. Hence those who plot to take His life can make the attempt only when "the people" are off their guard. This situation can just be gathered from Mark's few references to it, but Luke emphasizes it and dwells upon the *nearness of the people to Jesus*. He emphasizes it also in his account of the Passion. He omits the statement of Mark that the chief priests incited the multitude to cry out for the release of Barabbas and the destruction of Jesus (Mark xv. 8, 11);

he cannot exculpate the people entirely and he mentions them as siding with the leaders (Luke xxiii. 4, 13, 18). But he would still have us know of the widespread sympathy with Jesus, and so there is a striking contrast between his account of the Crucifixion and that of Mark. In Mark the Christ's isolation is complete. "They that passed by" (xv. 29), "the chief priests" (xv. 31), and "they that were crucified with him" (xv. 32) all unite in deriding Him. But Luke still distinguishes the people from the rulers, "and there followed him a great multitude of the people, and of women who bewailed and lamented him" (Luke xxiii. 27), "and the people stood beholding. And the rulers also scoffed at him" (xxiii. 35), "and all the multitudes that came together at this sight, when they beheld the things that were done, returned smiting their breasts" (xxiii. 48). The difference between Mark and Luke is clear, and Luke has somewhat softened the isolation of the Marcan portrait.

It seems that Luke is greatly impressed by the contrast between the "leaders" who persecute Jesus and the "people" who follow Him with loyal support. The contrast appears also in Luke's editing of the Q and L sources (cf. Luke xv. 1, 2; vii. 29, 30; xii. 1—all apparently "editorial"). Luke sees our Lord's controversy with the Pharisees as a manifestation of the broad contrast between "leaders" and "people." What distresses Luke most about the Pharisees is their inhumanity. They are oppressors. In Luke's "peculiar matter" there are three episodes of controversy with the Pharisees—"the woman who was a sinner," "the woman with a spirit of infirmity," "the dropsical man," and in each case the controversy is with the proud, oppressive, and inhuman temper. But who are "the people" in Luke's mind? Sometimes he speaks of ὁ λαός, sometimes of τὸ πλῆθος and sometimes he combines the two and speaks of πόλυ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ. He does not clearly discriminate; in Galilee, Judæa, and Jerusalem "the people" are enthusiastic hearers and followers, in contrast with the proud and oppressive religious aristocracy. It seems likely that, in taking the contrast between these two sections as one of his main themes, Luke has softened the hard fact which appears in Mark, *that in the last resort Jesus was equally isolated from both sections.*

Certainly the contrast between the two sections rests upon historical foundation. Mark makes the popularity of Jesus with crowds as clear as the antagonism of religious leaders. But the important point is that in Mark the references to popularity almost entirely disappear as the atmosphere of the *Via Crucis* deepens. This atmosphere is well expressed in the "numinous" verse: "And they were in the way, going up to

Jerusalem; and Jesus was going before them: and they were amazed; and they that followed were afraid" (Mark x. 32). Thereafter there are few references in Mark to the popularity of Jesus. There is a crowd as Jesus leaves Jericho (Mark x. 46); as Jesus enters Jerusalem *many* precede and follow Him crying "Hosanna" (Mark xi. 8), and there follow the few references to the people in the city, which we have already noticed. The strongest reference to popularity in these last days is Mark xii. 37, on which C. H. Turner wrote "*Heard him gladly** is definitely a stronger phrase than the original, which is hardly more than 'liked to listen to him.' The same phrase is used of Herod Antipas and the Baptist in vi. 20." Finally there comes Mark's picture of the lonely figure on the Cross. Luke, on the other hand, omits the "numinous" verse (Mark x. 32); he enlarges Mark's "many" on Palm Sunday into a vast crowd of triumphant worshippers, and, as we have seen, after emphasizing the popularity of Jesus with "the people" in the city he distinguishes "the people" on Calvary from the persecutors of Jesus. In short, this study of "the people" in Mark and Luke points us on to a study of the doctrine of the Cross in these two Gospels. Is there a big difference of emphasis, Mark telling us of a lonely *opus operatum* and of an unintelligible scandal, and Luke telling us of an act of love wrought by One who was loved and understood by "the people"?

THE CROSS IN MARK AND LUKE

The *δεῖ παθεῖν* is emphasized in Mark (Mark viii. 31; ix. 12, 31; x. 33; xiv. 21). It is emphasized with equal clearness in Luke, both in his "special source" and in his editing.

Luke xii. 50: But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!

Luke xiii. 33: Howbeit I must go on my way today and tomorrow and the day following, for it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.

Luke xxii. 37: For I say unto you, that this which is written must be fulfilled in me, And He was reckoned with the transgressors.

Luke xxiv. 26: Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory? (Cf. xxii. 44-46.)

Luke finds this teaching in his sources, and he accepts it and emphasizes it. He seems to write with a dramatic sense of the Lord's journey to Jerusalem to die (cf. ix. 51; xiii. 22; xvii. 11; xix. 28). He says rather more than Mark about the

* ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ ἡδέως.

death as the fulfilment of prophecy (cf. Luke xviii. 31), and his account of the Passion is fuller, more dramatic and more beautiful. And we reach a climax in his record of the Lord's words after the Resurrection.

"Then opened he their minds, that they might understand the scriptures; and he said unto them, Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day, and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name unto all the nations, beginning at Jerusalem" (Luke xxiv. 45-46).

So large a place does the Cross fill in Luke's Gospel; and yet a difference is felt to exist between his conception and that of Mark. Professor Creed writes, "In Luke we are appreciably further from the Pauline spirit than in Mark. Most striking is the entire absence of a Pauline interpretation of the Cross. The Marcan saying concerning the death of the Son of Man as "a ransom for many" (Mark x. 45) and the declaration at the Last Supper that the cup is the "blood of the covenant poured out for many" are absent. There is, indeed, no *theologia crucis* beyond the affirmation that the Christ must suffer, since so the prophetic scriptures had foretold."* Is this so? We must consider wherein exactly the difference lies between the Marcan and the Lucan emphasis.

"The Son of Man must suffer." The Apostolic Church saw in the Cross the fulfilment of prophecy and the working out of God's purpose; and the title "servant" figured in the teaching of the first Christians. Believing in a suffering Messiah, the first Christians were called to suffer in his footsteps, and rejoiced to be counted worthy to suffer for the Name. The reproach of suffering was gone; suffering was God's way for His Christ and it had its place in the Church's way of life. But these truths when first uttered by the Lord to the disciples had caused utter bewilderment, and it is Mark who, above all others, brings us into the atmosphere of bewilderment and horror at the idea of a suffering Messiah. Mark takes us right behind the Church's teaching and interpretation to the scandal and horror of the new conception. Isolated from the religious leaders who persecute Him, from his friends who do not understand Him, from the crowds to whom the mystery cannot be given, from the disciples who cannot fathom the mystery, the Son of Man goes in dreadful isolation to His Cross. Mark bids us see that the Cross is a scandal alike to the religious leaders, the people, and the disciples. The only word from the Cross which he records is the cry of dereliction. In such terrible isolation the redemptive work is done.

* *Commentary on St. Luke*, p. lxxii.

Now Luke has the same emphasis on the *δεῖ παθεῖν*; indeed, he seems to emphasize it still further; but the strangeness and scandal are not so felt as one reads his pages. The sense of the Lord's isolation seems far less present; the Cross is, in a way, something *intelligible*; it belongs to the same world as the Parables and the Lord's words and acts of love which make him not isolated but very near to "the people." Now it is not hard to explain this difference between Mark and Luke. Luke was not a Jew; he had never experienced the Jewish horror of a suffering Messiah, nor felt the terrible novelty of the Christian use of Isaiah liii. The only Messiah who has ever concerned him is the *Christian* Messiah, the Messiah who suffered. Luke writes as a Christian historian, and, with a wonderful sympathy with the Jewish origin of the Christian Church, he sees history as a unity. The scriptures foretold that the Christ should suffer, and the Christ came and suffered. Luke has probably never been much concerned with the scriptures *apart from their fulfilment by Christ*; hence, while the fact of the suffering Messiah appeals to him intensely, he hardly expresses its strangeness and novelty and scandal. A striking piece of Lucan editorial work makes this point clear. While Mark sees that there was no human reason why the disciples should understand the *δεῖ παθεῖν* and every human reason why they should not, Luke (by changes made in two passages) shows that he feels it to be strange that the disciples should *not* understand.

Mark ix. 32 : They understood not the saying, and were afraid to ask him.

Luke ix. 45 : But they understood not this saying, *and it was concealed from them that they should not perceive it*, and they were afraid to ask him about this saying.

Luke xviii. 34 : And they understood none of these things, and *this saying was hid from them*.

To Mark the truth needed no "hiding"; it was inevitably a scandal and a mystery. But Luke had never shared in the original horror of the tree, and to him prophecy and interpretation were one plain unity; the failure of the disciples to understand was so strange, that a theory of divine concealment is needed by Luke to account for it.

In so far as the reader of Luke misses the Marcan sense of the isolation of the Crucified and the scandal of the Cross, he misses a truth about the Lord's atoning work. Mark makes it so clear that the Cross cannot be fitted into any "humanitarian" categories; it is far different from human philanthropy, human heroism, human martyrdom. The kindest philanthropist, and the bravest hero, and the spiritual insight of the most

devout Jew will not find the Cross to be other than a scandal. But if we read Luke, quite apart from Mark, we might miss something of the scandal and be led to think of the Cross as something understood or understandable, the climax of sayings and acts of loving-kindness understood by "the people." Luke has mitigated the awfulness and the isolation, and it seems significant that he has omitted the saying about the "ransom for many" (Mark x. 45), and has inserted in a similar context, "I am among you as he that serveth." The contrast is between an isolated act which cannot be understood, and an act of goodness which is understood. This contrast appears in the accounts of the crucifixion in Mark and Luke. In Mark, Jesus dies in isolation, uttering a cry of dereliction, and the centurion does not understand but sees in the awful humiliation the act of one who is God's Son. In Luke the Crucifixion is in large part *understood*; the words of love and peace from the Cross link it with the life and teaching, and the centurion *understands* and says, "Certainly this was a righteous man."

Having thus seen that Luke obscures something which in Mark is quite fundamental, we must ask if Luke interprets the Cross to us in any ways where Mark helps us less. It seems that there are two ways in which Luke interprets the Cross as a Christian theologian.

(1) Luke shows that the death is the glorious climax of the life and is not defeat but the victory of love. It is no exaggeration to say that something "Johannine" appears in Luke's treatment of the Cross. His Passion narrative has a "Johannine" sense of the underlying spiritual conflict (*cf.* Luke xxii. 53, "This is your hour, and the power of darkness") and a note of triumph (*cf.* Luke xxiii. 46, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit"); the Christ in Luke looks ahead to the Passion as in John. He looks ahead to his "hour." Luke, more than Mark or Matthew, emphasizes the link between the Cross and the Transfiguration. And Luke's use of the word "glory" seems significant.

Luke ix. 26: when he cometh in his own glory and the glory of the Father.

Luke ix. 31: who appeared in glory, and spake of the decease which he was about to accomplish in Jerusalem.

Luke ix. 32: they saw his glory.

Luke ix. 51: when the days were well-nigh come that he should be received up.

Luke xiii. 32: the third day I am perfected.

Luke xxiv. 26: Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory?

(2) In another way, too, Luke's account of the life and death of Jesus seems to show us the experience and interpretation of the Cross in the Apostolic Church. The Lord's death issued in the sacrificial fellowship of the Christians whose life of self-surrender was a sharing in the Cross and a daily dying with Christ. From being an isolated and unintelligible act the Cross becomes an "intelligible" way of life in which the Christians share. In several ways Luke seems to reflect this experience; by mitigating the Lord's isolation, by describing His life and death as one close unity. Much of Luke's mind seems revealed in his addition of the word "daily" to the Marcan saying about the taking up of the disciples' Cross (Luke ix. 23).

In these two ways Luke seems to interpret the Cross in the light of the experience of the Apostolic Church. And we may sum up our study by saying that while, negatively, he obscures something which in Mark is central, yet, positively, he is indeed a theologian of the Cross and he points his reader on towards the Johannine words "glory" and "life."

This study suggests some reflections for the life and teaching of the Church today. The life of Christian sainthood moves, in relation to the Cross, in stages resembling the Marcan, Lucan, and Johannine "interpretations" of the Cross. First, the would-be disciple looks at the Cross from afar, with Mark, in awe and penitence, and, without understanding, he knows his frailty in face of a dreadful act of God, and is moved to worship by the "otherness" of what he sees. Then, with Luke, he learns that the Cross in the life of Christ's Body does not necessarily mean physical death but the daily dying of a surrendered life in devotion and in philanthropy; by sharing in the Cross he partly "understands" it as a way of life. Finally, his life-in-Christ leads him to a breach with the world so complete that, with John, he knows that the Cross is "glory." But the "Lucan" and "Johannine" experiences spring from the grim "Marcan" fact, and if the vision of this fact is left out, endless heresies and perversions may arise.

Now today in English Christianity great emphasis is being placed on the "Lucan" stage; this is done by translating the Cross into terms of a "sacrificial attitude in life," or, elsewhere, into terms of the daily dying of the disciplined life of devotion. Both these "translations" are "Lucan" and both are Christian. But they depend for their truth upon the "Marcan" fact, and a great danger today lies in the widespread tendency to ignore the "Marcan" fact and the "Marcan" element in devotion. It is possible by one-sided interpretations of some features of the "Lucan" experience, combined with an ignoring of Mark's

picture of Christ's isolation, to glide easily into humanitarian errors, and to teach the Cross as the "intelligible" principle of life and as the supreme instance of a "spirit of self-sacrifice," using these phrases in a humanistic and Pelagian sense. But the work of the Lord, in history and in relation to every converted life, is first done in isolation, a scandal to Jew and to Greek and a scandal to all the world's ideas of sacrifice and philanthropy whether in the first century or the twentieth. And Christian life will always start with, and constantly return to, Mark's picture of an unintelligible Divine act, wrought in humiliation by a Christ lonely in life and lonely in death.

A. M. RAMSEY.

CHARLES GORE

NOTES FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY, 1924-1931

THE following notes are based on a friendship with Bishop Gore which I was privileged to enjoy, extending over the last seven years of his life. They are not to be considered as in any sense a connected study of his mind—for which as a layman I am naturally incompetent—and except in two places, do not draw upon his written work.

It was in order to get help and advice in a crisis of religious belief that I first went with an introduction to the Bishop. He was living then at No. 6, Margaret Street, and I shall never forget the embrace of that truly "numinous" figure which thrust me out into the dark late one November night. (He was of the company of those Gallic bishops, *viri apostolici*, whom he loved to remember, before whom all were struck with religious awe.) Meetings which thus began from force of circumstance developed into friendly suppers and outings at which he would do his best to satisfy my theological appetite which he never seemed to think the unseemly, inordinate thing that it was. And although light came in the end from other sources, they seemed to make no difference to the warmth of his friendship and generosity. It was in these conversations that I came gradually to feel I was learning something about his mind as it emerged against a background of von Hügel, Troeltsch, Otto, Spens, and others. And it is in the same perspective that I shall try to present it here.

It is sometimes said that Gore's mind did not develop after the crisis in his thought represented by *Lux Mundi*. If by this

is meant that he was not aware of, or had not tried to come to terms with, most of the best that had been said and written in the relevant fields since then, it seems to me clearly untrue. He was a systematic and astonishingly rapid reader, carefully annotating all the more important books. And he had friends of every age and profession into whose intellectual interests he entered with inexhaustible zest. To disagree with an author without being able to say why was a source of mental distress to him, and he spoke gleefully more than once of the satisfaction of disagreeing and at the same time of seeing clearly the grounds for disagreement. On the other hand, if the statement means that by the time *Lux Mundi* came to be published he had adopted principles which he retained substantially unaltered for the rest of his life, it seems to me to contain much truth. I sometimes felt that to explain certain characteristic positions it was necessary to go back behind the immediate arguments to earlier mental habits. It was as if the intense conflict of those early days in Oxford had left its mark on a sensitive and highly strung nature so that his mind latterly tended to run into fixed gladiatorial attitudes suitable, let us say, to a battle with a Traditionalist, an encounter with a Darwinian, a deadly grappling with a Papist, and so on. He had been fighting so intensely and on so many different fronts that the alignments almost became established frontiers.

His later outlook, as I came to know it, was not favourably disposed towards the modern emphasis on instinct and the seemingly automatic determinants of personality. Instinct for Gore was predominantly moral instinct, the "stern daughter of the voice of God," as he was fond of quoting from Wordsworth; when it was not that, it was apt to be something against which we had to be a little on our guard. His distrust of non-rational elements in experience had been deepened by some very unfavourable results of psycho-analysis which had been brought to his notice. "I don't like these people who lay the blame for their own shortcomings on their parents and their early upbringing" was a repercussion. I fancy his view was that once spirit had emerged it should be spirit indeed, in its own right and on its own level; that in human personality there were certainly two levels, sense and spirit, but not a sense-and-spirit complex, woven like warp and woof.

His own sense of unity and balance and his un-self-consciousness may possibly have withheld from his direct experience something of the function of organic factors in the texture of spirit. Or it may be that Oxford Idealism influenced his thought more than he knew. Certainly he was not in any sense a strict philosophical Idealist—"There must be something

wrong with a man who is in doubt about an external world existing, at least to some extent, in its own right," was a vigorous remark in the Dr. Johnson manner—but G. H. Lewes and Spencer and W. K. Clifford were all in those days influences strongly on the materialist or monistic side, and *esse is percipi* or *cogito, ergo sum* were convenient sticks with which to beat their dog. Not that Gore himself ever occupied these positions, or at least not in his later years—but Illingworth in his *Bampton Lectures* and elsewhere repeatedly uses modifications of them, drawn from Schopenhauer and T. H. Green, for the purpose of throwing into relief the imperviousness and autonomy of the Self; and Idealism in the Platonic form, that all profitable knowledge is intuition of essences, was, I think, distinctly congruous with Gore's later mind (although he would have guarded it by emphasizing the derivation of heavenly knowledge from earthly experience. See *The Philosophy of the Good Life*, pp. 119 and 122). Such a view would have difficulty in accounting naturally and easily for elementary beginnings, larval forms, and for knowledge in the sense of information about distant objects, proper to animals groping in a mysterious medium. If there is any truth in this contention it would explain how the objects of Gore's immediate universe were clear and brilliantly lit; and yet how at the same time his ultimate background (especially with regard to the problem of evil) was rich in just such graded *nuances*—a central luminous point of Faith, the Incarnation, shading off into darkness, into "a reverent Agnosticism." And it indicates that the differing perspectives were really drawn from differing sources of experience—the ultimate background from Religion itself and from its own circle of ideas and symbols; the foreground, seen in the sharp, white light of Idealism, not quite in keeping with the *penumbra* of the rest. ("Oxford Idealism" was a bait always certain to get a rise. "There ain't no such thing," or, "If indeed it ever existed," were common retorts.)

Certainly the emphasis of his mind always fell on thought rather than opaque thing and this was in keeping not only with his tendency to minimize instinctive, pre-ethical modes of behaviour, but with a corresponding disinclination to accept sociological environment as an intrinsic element in the development of personality. His dislike of theories attributing morbid changes in the character of children to the psychological climate generated by their parents has already been mentioned. But it sometimes appeared as if he did not allow sufficiently for the influence on ideas and character of sociological factors outside the family. The valuable elements contributed, *e.g.*, by a ruling aristocratic society are well illustrated in Gore's own

character. His fearlessness, power of leadership, candour, utter lack of self-consciousness would surely have undergone *some* modification within a Minority atmosphere. And does it not seem likely that the world of Whig economic ideas, as well as Oxford Idealism, contributed deep, instinctive habits of mind, and that his view of Authority as the ultimate rationality presiding over the free competition between ideas was in some real though obscure sense the analogue of *laissez-faire* applied to the world of intellectual commodities?

This quality of Idealism in his thought was reinforced by his view of Development which was drawn more from the historical than the biological sciences. It was more Hebraic than Darwinian, and its most natural field of investigation was the movement of moral forces and ideas rather than the different philogenetic levels to be distinguished in an organism. Illingworth, it is true, in *Lux Mundi* and elsewhere, disclosed strongly Alexandrine tendencies in the emphasis he laid on Divine immanence in nature, the cosmic significance of the Incarnation, and a single uniform process of development; and this served its purpose admirably as a vehicle for introducing general evolutionary ideas. (Whether it is equally successful in interpreting the *qualitative* differences between Religion and other cultural forms is another question.) A strain of thought of this nature undoubtedly existed in Gore's mind, and only a year or two before his death he was emphasizing in conversation the cosmic significance of the Incarnation as a criticism of certain points in the treatment (in *Essays Catholic and Critical*) of Christ's bodily Resurrection. But I do not think the emphasis on immanence and uniformity represented his deepest mind, which was essentially historical and prophetic.

It is widely recognized that this prophetic quality was the source of his deep influence on national life. But it seems to me also to be true that in his treatment of Religion it was the same quality, the predominantly ethical note, which singled him out more than anything else from the other great religious thinkers of his day—Otto, von Hügel, and Troeltsch. Otto's book *The Idea of the Holy* did not greatly impress him. "Otto's Holy is too much an affair of the emotions," he said. Nor was he able to accept the religious *a priori* in any form; or yet a specifically religious sense. "Religion is an orientation of the *whole personality*; Newman surely had that quite right." But for Gore this "whole personality" seemed at times to exclude both the dumb, inarticulate roots, and the supra-rational projections, and to contract down to ethical subject. Doubtless, as Mr. C. C. J. Webb has shown, the emphasis on Moral Law was one of the characteristics of the Tractarian Revival, and

hence would have been one of the formative influences on Gore's early mind. Whenever confronted by what he considered a dangerous emphasis on mysticism or by a thorough-going Agnosticism, he would in each case fall back on his dominant conviction: "After all the only thing certain is that we are certain we must do what is right." His emphasis on the moral presuppositions of Faith was in the manner of Newman in his Anglican days.

It is interesting to compare him here with von Hügel. Where Gore said "moral presuppositions," von Hügel wrote "spiritual dispositions," meaning by this something wider than and different from moral character.* This difference in phraseology corresponded to a difference in fundamental attitude. Gore had none of the metaphysical *passion* which gave such a characteristic quality to von Hügel's thought, and he was not at home with the mystical element in Religion. "I don't understand all this talk of a *Totum Simul*," he once said; and on another occasion, discussing the strongly abstract, anti-incarnational trend in St. John of the Cross, he said (perhaps with a touch of paradox), "I have never been able to make up my mind whether St. John of the Cross was a Christian or not." Von Hügel's view of mysticism as being Religion in its most intense and characteristic form and at the same time being in essence mysteriously unrelated to moral considerations, was contrary to everything for which Gore stood. Von Hügel was prepared to consider the possibility of having to separate religious insight from moral judgments even in our Lord's own consciousness (see *Selected Letters*, pp. 159 and 160). In Gore's view our Lord's religious insight and His moral judgments were equally final and authoritative.

Certain other characteristics in Gore's thought led him into further disagreement with von Hügel, and also with Troeltsch, over the nature of Dogma. It is probable that von Hügel, even in his later, more conservative period, allowed much more place to the incubation of the data of religious experience within an institutional matrix than Gore could ever allow. This in turn enabled him to adopt a more radical attitude towards critical questions (in particular towards the Fourth Gospel and the problem of Eschatology) than Gore felt was justified, and it led him to lay greater emphasis on institutionalism and concrete, organic roots. Gore's view of Dogma was rational-historicist. It was a system of theological ideas based on History, and it must maintain itself in the open, competitive field by a fearless appeal to the "reasoning of the

* A distinction bearing some relation perhaps to the possibility of admiring a person's moral character and at the same time disliking his personality.

religious mind"—to use Newman's Anglican phrase. (The essential, human differences between the two men are well brought out in the incident—not without humour—related by von Hügel in the *Letters*: von Hügel, with his Austrian father and Scotch mother, involved in a complicated argument about principle and method, being pulled up by Gore to ask whether all this was "really English." It is plain that the Baron was a little ruffled.)

Gore never seems to have been touched by the Modernist movement in the Roman Church. He showed no evidence of ever having been tempted, in the interests of Dogma, to make the Protestant transition from a system of theological ideas based on History to a system of religious experiences valid in themselves, and he had difficulty in appreciating the positions of Father Tyrrell and the present Master of Corpus in their attempts to adapt such principles to the Catholic position. On this question of the relation between religious experience and Dogma he was at one with Dr. Tennant's views expressed in his *Philosophical Theology*, a work he had very carefully annotated and greatly admired (although he disagreed with the view that our only reliable knowledge about the Divine nature is inferential). Gore held with Dr. Tennant that religious experiences cannot be regarded as immediate *analytica* comparable with the impressional elements associated with data of Science; but that they are *religious* experiences precisely because they contain an element of cognitive interpretation (see *Philosophical Theology*, vol. i., p. 331). "The argument from religious experience lets you believe what you like," he said. On the other hand religious experience widened to include the "reasoning of the religious mind" was the very basis of his apologetic. And he agreed with von Hügel that "factual happenings" are a necessary condition of the *givenness* of Religion.

But if he thus rejected the characteristic Protestant conception of Dogma as a system of religious experiences valid in themselves, he did not, as far as I could see, advance to the characteristic Catholic alternative of a system of theological ideas based on Cultus. Between these two conceptions his thought seemed to hang in a curious *intermezzo*. Doubtless many influences were at work—the absence of sociological conceptions in the Tractarian tradition (as Mr. Webb has pointed out), the early influence of Idealism, his own characteristic ethical individualism, and his disinclination to recognize a hierarchy in spiritual levels, might all be mentioned. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that an interpretation of what might be considered the substance of the Catholic position

such as that given by Troeltsch—that the primitive and fundamental religious idea lies somewhere in the region of the unconscious and is imbedded in Cultus, and that Dogma is to be regarded as the gradual working through and elaboration of this preconscious spirituality*—was a conception thoroughly unacceptable to Gore.

There was one further and final aspect of his thought which I gradually came to see was of fundamental importance to his outlook—his firm refusal to allow any form of the “Two-Standard” conception in a Christian sociology. All such interpretations he regarded as a betrayal of the Gospel ethic. Only three months before his death he referred to this with such vehemence that I realized the subject was not one which I might discuss. His position in this matter seemed to me determined in part by his largely unmetaphysical outlook which did not lead him to make natural distinctions in ontological level, and in part by his absorption in the ethical aspects of Religion and his zeal for social justice. The recognition of particular types of ethical idea associated with particular sociological groupings is a corollary of any two-level theory, and this Gore was unable to accept. Indeed, the denial of this, and the assertion that on the whole and in the long run the history of morality shows an approximation to a common ideal, “a tendency towards unity,” was one of his most important lines of argument. Von Hügel was enabled to retain the Sermon on the Mount in its naïf and literal sense as one of the two poles in his Nature-Supernature synthesis by holding that in its unmitigated strictness the Gospel ethic was applicable only to the “Church complex,” whilst at the same time recognizing a homely give-and-take relationship between the two levels. Gore’s high-pitched spirituality could not accept this flexible solution. Yet since he held that no one of the maxims of the Sermon on the Mount could be made obligatory on Christians without upsetting the whole basis of society, and without ignoring a contrary maxim which our Lord gives us in another connection,† he was led to emphasize the “proverbial” nature of the prescriptions in order to retain them as providing a “social law for Christians.” This entailed an approximation of the two ethical poles of Nature and Supernature until they fused into the ethic of a “Christian Society.” It was, I think, Troeltsch’s sympathetic treatment of the “two-level” compromise arrived at by Thomism, and his view that it permitted genuine flexibility and resourcefulness of outlook, which was in part the cause of Gore’s distinctly critical estimate of his

* See *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, p. 996.

† *The Sermon on the Mount*, 2nd. edit., p. 110.

great work *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*. (Gore possessed the German edition but worked hard to have it translated, and contributed a Preface of characteristic brevity and caution.)

There were other reasons for this estimate—e.g., Troeltsch's treatment of Christian origins and eschatological problems, and his astonishing omission of any mention of Anglican sociological ideas whilst seeming to know all about "Behmenists" and "Diggers." "Troeltsch has written one very good book," he said, "but sometimes he doesn't see the wood for the trees."*

At one point Gore gave the appearance of weakening in his opposition to "two-level" theories—in his well-known advocacy and support of the Religious Life. But this was regarded not as a difference in level, but as a differentiation in function; the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience must be "evidently before men's eyes." And here, too, there were qualifications. Exclusively enclosed or contemplative orders were, he thought, exposed to such subtle moral dangers as to be rarely if ever justified. And vows of life-long celibacy he regarded as pernicious and dangerous; only temporary vows, repeated from time to time, should be demanded. Of the value of strictly ascetical practices—apart from the ordinary opportunities of self-discipline arising out of the conduct of life—he was very critical, more so, he said, than in his early years. "I believe that the men who, to my knowledge, practised the greatest bodily austerities, injured their health in the end, and the quality of their minds." And he was doubtful about the evangelical basis of acts of reparation, more doubtful again than in early manhood. He distrusted ideals applicable only to special or deliberately created circumstances and which could not be directly translated into social good. "Christian Ethics are social ethics through and through."

J. CONWAY DAVIES.

* I never heard him discuss the following point in conversation, but there is a passage in his *Lectures on Christ and Society* where he does not seem to me quite to meet Troeltsch's views as to the significance of the Nature-Supernature complex. Troeltsch held that ascetic Protestantism in breaking away from this compromise tended to find the field for ascetic practice within activities exclusively of a this-world type, and that such a temper, in conjunction with economic occasions of accidental origin, facilitated the rise of Capitalism (*op cit.* p. 915). Gore treats this position—without indeed referring it to Troeltsch—as equivalent to a criticism of Protestant "individualism," and meets it by the counter-charge that the whole of post-Reformation religion, Catholic as well as Protestant, was tarred with the same brush. "It is a grave and just charge against post-Reformation religion as a whole that it allowed itself to become individualistic and falsely other-worldly" (*Christ and Society*, p. 124). But "individualism" was not quite the point of Troeltsch's analysis, except in so far as this resulted from confining asceticism to the field of work and labour. What was in question was the break-up of the Thomist synthesis between Nature and Grace.

THE EXODUS AND THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE*

THE escape of Israel from Egypt is one of those events about which we may have a great deal of discussion, though there can be no doubt as to its substantial historicity. It may be true that we have no contemporary documentary evidence from any source whatever, and that details in the story awaken suspicion, but its substantial historicity should be beyond dispute. Every tradition is in itself a fact, and, therefore, requires an explanation from the scientific mind. The only probable explanation of a tradition is an event, and, though it may not have been exactly that which the surviving stories describe, and though details added in the course of oral transmission may, and probably will, have changed the shape of it, yet we may be able to conjecture, with more or less confidence, the original form which it took.

This is especially true of such traditions as those which tell us of the Exodus. There can be few examples of a race-memory which has exercised a more profound influence on the thought and history of any community than this. To it Israel described the foundation alike of its nationality and of its religion, and to it later Hebrews were always liable to appeal. An event whose memory dominated the whole outlook of a people, as the Exodus dominated that of Israel, cannot have been a pure figment of the imagination or the reflection back into history of cosmological, eschatological, or other ideas.

The Conquest of Palestine is still more obviously historical. Not only Hebrew tradition but also much of the thought and outlook of the later people betrays the overwhelming influence of a point of view which belongs much more to the Semitic nomad than to the settled communities of the Nearer East. Further, we know from evidence outside the Bible that Palestine has always been subject to inroads from the wilderness to the east and south, and that there has been a constant infiltration of the tribes on the border of the Fertile Crescent into the richer lands. Even if we had no traditions of the Conquest, we should be compelled to assume it as a historic fact, just as anthropological considerations make it inevitable that we should posit a partial or complete Anatolian occupation of Palestine, for which we have practically no documentary evidence at present.

There remain, nevertheless, countless details on which we

* For a fuller discussion of the principal points considered in this article readers are referred to chapters v. and viii. of Professor Robinson's *History of Israel*, vol. i. —ED.

can have no certainty, and are compelled to make the best guess we can from the materials at our disposal. This applies to both events, the Exodus and the Conquest, but in considering the latter we can adduce external evidence of a kind which is almost entirely lacking for the former. The period to which the departure of Israel from Egypt must belong is, on the whole, fairly well documented, but we have not the slightest trace of a reference to the Exodus in any Egyptian record yet discovered. It is true that Josephus, followed by at least one modern scholar, identifies the Exodus with the expulsion of the Hyksos, but this is a position which involves so many difficulties as to make it practically untenable, and, though the rise of the XVIIIth Dynasty may help us in certain ways to get near the truth, we feel that we must use this date rather as a *terminus a quo*.

The two questions round which discussion on the Exodus naturally centres are the date and the place. The former of these is intimately bound up with a discussion of the Conquest, since the two events must obviously have been separated by at least a generation. The exact locality at which the sea was crossed is, however, entirely independent of the later history, and can be considered entirely by itself.

Our Biblical record of the Exodus, in its simplest form, may be briefly stated as follows: A group of Aramæan tribes—"Hebrews"—which had made their home on the grazing lands lying between Egypt and Palestine, after some generations of friendly treatment by the Egyptian government, were subjected to forced labour by a new dynasty. At length Moses, a Hebrew by birth but trained in the Egyptian court, brought to his fellow-tribesmen a message from a God whom he had learnt to know during an enforced residence among another nomad community, that of Midian, or, possibly, of Kenites. This God, revealed under the name Yahweh, bade Moses secure the liberation of the tribes, that they might participate in a solemn festival at the mountain where the revelation was made. Moses accepted the commission and demanded the release of his compatriots. This was refused by the Egyptian king, whose people and land were thereupon subjected to various plagues. At last, since the people could not celebrate the festival at the appointed spot, Moses made the best arrangements he could for its observance in Egypt. The people could not go to the home of Yahweh, so Yahweh came to Egypt, with disastrous consequences for the Egyptians. In the confusion which followed, Israel escaped, but was pursued to the edge of the "Red Sea." The waters receded and allowed the fugitives to cross, but their enemies were drowned in trying to follow them. Then the people

proceeded to the sacred mountain, where they were brought into vital contact with Yahweh.

Leaving aside such questions as to the number of Israelites involved or the tribes to which they belonged, we note at once certain features which give us chronological limits. The dynasty which favoured the Aramæans must surely have belonged to the Hyksos, and the oppressive king to one of the restored native families—*i.e.*, to the XVIIIth or XIXth Dynasty. This places the Exodus somewhere after 1600 B.C. Exod. i. 11 mentions Pithom and Ramses as the two cities built by Israelite labour, and this led, naturally, to the view that the Pharaoh of the oppression was Ramses II. (c. 1292-1225 B.C.)* and the Pharaoh of the Exodus was his son Merneptah. When Naville identified a city in the Wadi Tumilat, built by Ramses II., with Pithom, the matter seemed settled, and it became customary to accept a date about 1220 B.C. for the Exodus. But doubts arose. Naville's identification was challenged, and it was observed that an inscription of Merneptah spoke of "Israel" as a people in (northern) Palestine, while others of the XIXth Dynasty alluded to Asher as a tribe located where all Hebrew tradition put them. It was suggested that both names belonged to people settled in the land long before the Conquest and later absorbed by the Aramæan invaders. But Hebrew tradition persistently connected Asher with Gad, always a Transjordanian tribe, and, since the whole theory rests on the two names in Exod. i. 11, which might very well have been inserted by a copyist or editor, the balance of evidence is much in favour of an earlier date—say in the XVIIIth Dynasty. As we shall see in speaking of the Conquest other facts tend to support this view.

We turn now to the crossing of the sea, the great event which so impressed the imagination of later Israel. We have two narratives interwoven with one another in Exod. xiv., but we need, naturally, concern ourselves only with the earlier. The old story, then, tells us that, when Israel reached the shore, a strong east wind drove the water back, enabling the fugitives to cross safely. The Egyptians followed, but their chariot-wheels were clogged by the clinging sand; a panic came upon them, and, when they tried to flee, the sea returned and overwhelmed them.

There is nothing to rouse historical doubts in this story, but it raises serious questions. Which was the sea crossed by the Israelites? How was it temporarily dried up? The crossing of the Jordan is satisfactorily explained by the assumption of a heavy landslide (such as has occurred in much later days) higher up the river, choking its flow for a time. But there is

* The Egyptian dates cited in this article are those of Breasted (see *A History of the Ancient Egyptians*).

no room for such a theory in the case of the Exodus, and, while we may accept the main outline of the facts, we must look for some other cause for the phenomena.

The sea is called the "*Yam Suph*," generally explained as "Sea of reeds" or "Sea of weed." But where was this *Yam Suph*? Three sites have been suggested. One is that it was the Gulf of Suez, which in ancient times probably extended much further north than it does now, since the sand ridge between it and the Bitter Lakes is very low and was obviously once a sea-bottom. In that case an abnormal tide, aided by violent winds, would produce the effects described and would account for the tradition of divine interference, for the tide must always have seemed a miracle to people whose sea was the Mediterranean, and, though the rise and fall at Suez is not great, it may have been larger in ancient times, especially in exceptional circumstances. The quicksand suggested by the trouble with the chariots is also in favour of this view, as anyone will agree who has seen the tide flowing in Morecambe Bay or in the Solway Firth.

A second view identifies the *Yam Suph* with the Gulf of Akaba. This is bound up with the location of the sacred mountain to the east of that inlet, where Midian lived in the days of Josephus. In its most developed form (that suggested by Gressmann) it involved a volcanic eruption with an accompanying earthquake. The latter would have the effect of raising the sea-bottom and then of depressing it, as happened in the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755. The difficulties of the theory in this form are two: (a) there seems to be little, if any, trace of volcanic activity between the Hauran in the north and the Harras in the south during recent geological time; (b) the sacred mountain is not so near the sea as this theory would require, being some days journey distant. And, if Sinai is to be located (as seems most probable) at or near Ain Kadis (=Kadesh Barnea), it is too far from the Gulf of Akaba, and the Gulf of Suez or some more northerly point would be more natural.

This last difficulty does not apply to the third view, comparatively recently propounded, e.g., by Major Jarvis, and independently worked out by Eissfeldt. This places the crossing almost on the shore of the Mediterranean, along the narrow strip of sand which separates the sea from the Sirbonian Lake. This view is supported by the identification of Baal Zaphon, one of the places mentioned, with an ancient sacred site in this neighbourhood.

There is, then, something to be said for each of the three localities suggested, but none of them can claim evidence so

strong as to justify us in asserting a decided probability, still less a practical certainty.

The occupation of western Palestine by the Aramæan tribes was a long and slow process, which remained incomplete, apparently, practically until the foundation of the monarchy. Especially in its later stages it should be described as assimilation rather than as conquest, and over the greater part of the country we find a population of mixed ancestry, which contained a comparatively small proportion of true Aramæan blood, though the dominance of the Israelite invaders imposed on the whole population the ideals and traditions which they had brought into the land. The Conquest proper consisted in the establishment of the tribes in Palestine at three points—the extreme south, the central range from the Jerusalem district to the Plain of Esdraelon, and in the north where some tribes made their home to the north and north-west of Galilee.

The long separation between Judah and the other tribes—a separation which, in a sense, remained as long as Israel held its own in Palestine—suggests that the southern attacks were made independently of the rest. In the earliest forms of tradition Judah does not appear; the invaders are Kenites, Kenizzites, and, perhaps, Jerachmeelites, clans which were later loosely included in the general term "Judah," though the actual connection is not easy to trace. In its present form, the narrative tells of a movement southwards from Jerusalem after the death of Joshua, resulting in the capture of Hebron, Debir, Arad, and Hormah (Judg. i. 8-17), but this has clearly been accommodated to the theory of a single invasion under Joshua, for Jerusalem did not fall into Israelite hands until the days of David. It seems, then, probable that the invasion was made directly from the south, and that the four places mentioned were occupied in the opposite order to that in which the passage cited places them. Judah itself may have been a Canaanite tribe, absorbed by the new-comers only in the generations which immediately preceded the rise of David, owing to the pressure of the Philistines.

In any case the main invasion was that which is said to have taken place under Joshua, crossing the Jordan, making good its foothold in the central range as far south as Gibeon (whence a branch succeeded in gaining a place on the coast), and gradually working northwards. There may have been another and less successful assault made from the Jabbok region, resulting in the sack of Shechem, but the evidence (Gen. xxxiv.) leads us to suspect that this did not secure a permanent hold on the land, which had to be recovered later.

As we have seen, the *terminus a quo* for the Exodus cannot be placed earlier than about 1600 B.C. The *terminus ad quem* for the Conquest is supplied by the advent of the Philistines, who, repulsed from the borders of Egypt in or about 1190 B.C. by Ramses III., must have settled down on the coast south of Carmel during the succeeding half-century. Now one of our most ancient pieces of Hebrew poetry, the Song of Deborah (Judg. v.), knows nothing of the Philistines, and two of the tribes mentioned in it, Dan and Asher, are still settled on the coast. This position is hardly conceivable after the Philistine invasions, and we may claim the very strong probability that Israel was already established in the centre and the north (though not in the Plain of Esdraelon) by about 1200 B.C.

Throughout the greater part of these four centuries Palestine was, nominally, under Egyptian Government. Imperial organization, however, was still in its infancy (this is the first occasion in history on which it is clearly attested), and the authority of the overlord varied a good deal with the personality and strength of the reigning sovereigns. The first conquests by Thothmes III. (1479 B.C. onwards) were maintained for a time by his successors, but, with the decline of the XVIIIth Dynasty (to which Thothmes belonged) there came a period of weakness in the middle of the fourteenth century, and Egypt counted for little in Palestine till the accession of Ramses II., of the XIXth Dynasty, about 1292 B.C. The close of the thirteenth century saw another period of weakness, and though Ramses III., as we have seen, repelled the Philistines, there was no effective control of Palestine by Egypt after their settlement.

It is clear that a successful invasion, such as that of Joshua, can have taken place only at a time when Egyptian influence was comparatively weak, and we are, therefore, limited practically to three periods. The first is before the conquests of Thothmes—i.e., roughly the sixteenth century—the second during the latter part of the fourteenth century—say from 1370 B.C. onwards, though it may have begun a little earlier—and the third is the end of the thirteenth century, at a time when the XIXth Dynasty was giving way to the XXth. As we have seen, however, Israel's position was well established by 1200 B.C., and we may rule out this last date as being highly improbable. Incidentally, we may remark, this conclusion militates, almost conclusively, against a XIXth Dynasty date for the Exodus.

Of the other two periods, it seems, on *a priori* grounds, that the earlier is less probable than the later. Even if we place the Exodus fairly early in the sixteenth century (and, as we have seen, its date is very much dependent on that of the

Conquest) we allow a comparatively short time for the nomad period in Israel's history, and for the occupation of Transjordan, for the national and religious tradition which made the various tribes and clans into a people must have required some time to get a firm hold on the Hebrew consciousness. We should, further, have expected the conquests of Thothmes III. to have left some mark on Israelite story. Those of Ramses II. do not fall into the same category, for he seems to have fought no battle on Palestinian soil; his objective lay further north, in the valley of the Orontes. Probably the appearance of an Egyptian army on the coast road was enough to prevent the inhabitants from rising to oppose him, and he simply resumed the traditional authority of the Egyptian crown over the country. Moreover, there can have been few, if any, Israelite tribes directly on his line of march. The most probable period, then, for the conquests of Joshua, seems to be during the fourteenth century B.C.

Such external evidence as we have confirms the impression thus formed. The first Israelite conquest to the west of the Jordan was Jericho (unless we admit the theory of an earlier assault on Shechem mentioned above). The site has been excavated, and the first opinion of the more recent explorers was that the city showed no traces of occupation between about 1500 and the ninth century B.C. That opinion, however, has now been revised, and Professor Garstang is convinced that the walls were destroyed by an earthquake (which might well be the origin of the tradition preserved in the Book of Joshua) about the end of the fifteenth century. His actual date is 1407 B.C., but his calculations involve a literal acceptance of the figures given in the earlier historical books of the Old Testament, and these have been subject to too many vicissitudes to be accepted as wholly reliable. But, even if we are suspicious as to the definite year of the fall of Jericho, we need have no doubt as to the correctness of Professor Garstang's archæological opinions, which would give us a date for the fall of Jericho roughly about 1400 B.C.

To this we may add the evidence derived from the famous Tell-el-Amarna letters. This is no place to discuss a matter which has been so fully and so often treated elsewhere; it is enough to remind ourselves that these documents attest a series of attacks from the east on Palestine throughout the middle of the fourteenth century, beginning even before the accession of Ikhnaton to the Egyptian throne (c. 1375 B.C.). The invaders are variously called SA-GAZ, an ideographic term whose phonetic equivalent is uncertain, and Habiru (in correspondence emanating from Jerusalem), a word which is philo-

logically identical with "Hebrew." We cannot be certain that they are the Israelites under Joshua, but there is obviously a strong probability that their assaults are to be connected in some way with those of Israel, and the invasion under Joshua may well have been included among their inroads. It does not follow that all the Habiru were Israelites, and we have seen ground for believing that not all the Israelite invasions took place at the same period—that of the north may well have been later, though we have no evidence at all outside the Bible.

We may, then, sum up such conclusions as seem most probable. A body of Semitic nomads, normally resident in the grazing-lands between Egypt and Palestine, came into friendly relations with Egypt during the Hyksos period. Later they, or some of them, were subjected to forced labour under the early kings of the XVIIIth Dynasty. Under the leadership of Moses they escaped, crossing an arm of the sea at some point which cannot be exactly determined. At the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century B.C., some Aramæan tribes bearing the tradition of this deliverance, but, possibly, including additional elements gathered in course of time, appeared on the borders of Palestine. One group made their way, very slowly, northwards from the region of Ain Kadis; another, which had made a temporary settlement in Gilead and Bashan, crossed the Jordan under the leadership of Joshua, made good its footing in the central hills of Palestine, and gradually spread northwards as far as the Plain of Esdraelon; while a third seems to have crossed the Jordan between the Sea of Galilee and Lake Huleh, and occupied the land as far as the Phœnician coast. A full unity of blood and tradition between the last two was fully recognized by the end of the thirteenth century B.C., though there was no common organization or central government. The southern group, however, was closely linked with the other two only by David, and the bond between Judah and Israel was never strong enough to weld them into a lasting political whole, though the acceptance of the Aramæan traditions by the south gave them an ideal and a religious unity which was never wholly lost.

T. H. ROBINSON.

A TABLE OF THE APPROXIMATE DATES OF EVENTS IN EGYPTIAN HISTORY BEARING ON THE HEBREW EXODUS AND CONQUEST OF WESTERN PALESTINE*

	B.C.
Expulsion of Hyksos (Semitic rulers of Egypt)	1580
XVIIIth Dynasty	1580-1350
Thothmes III. sole ruler of Egypt	1479-1447
Egyptian conquest of Palestine	1479

* The dates are those of Breasted.

	B.C.
Amenhotep III.	1411-1375
Sa Gaz (Habiru) inroads first mentioned	c. 1385
Ikhnaton (Amenhotep IV.)	1375-1385
<i>XIXth Dynasty</i>	1350-1205
Seti I.	c. 1313-1292
Ramses II.	1292-1225
Merneptah	1225-1215
<i>XXth Dynasty</i>	1200-1090
Ramses III.	1198-1167
Philistines defeated in Palestine	c. 1190
Philistines repulsed from the Egyptian frontier	c. 1187

THE INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

LAST June the Committee of the International Missionary Council met for ten days' conference at Herrnhut in Germany. There were about forty of us, of all races. China, Japan, Corea, India, the Philippines, Mexico—all sent native representatives as well as the nations of Europe and America: and the subjects we discussed were mostly of world-wide significance. But the International Missionary Council is very little known, and the object of this paper is to draw attention to a phenomenon which, though at present small as a man's hand, is yet already of considerable importance, and may prove eventually to be a constructive influence in the history of the Catholic Church.

The International Missionary Council is the result of evolutionary processes. In 1910 a World Missionary Conference was held in Edinburgh, attended by 3,000 delegates of all races and all Christian organizations (other than Rome), which marked a new era in the history of World Evangelization. The work of the Conference was carried on for some years by a Continuation Committee, and under its auspices "National Christian Councils" began to take shape in many non-Christian countries with the object of promoting co-operation between the Missions wherever co-operation was desirable and possible. Strong National Christian Councils now exist in India, China, Japan, the Near East, and other regions, and their work on the whole has yielded admirable results. Meanwhile the Continuation Committee, which consisted of representatives from Britain, America, and the European countries, was forced to move with the stream, and about ten years ago it formed itself into the International Missionary Council with a constitution and due representation of all the National Missionary Councils,

and with the object of being a clearing house and advisory agency for all the local bodies. Mr. John Mott, LL.D., known throughout the world for his life-long devotion to the cause, his statesmanship, and his burning missionary zeal, is the chairman, and he is assisted by a Committee of the Council upon which the "Sending Countries" are fully represented. The Committee meets once in three years or thereabouts, and the Council itself aims at meeting about every ten years.

The International Missionary Council is thus the fruit of evolutionary processes: it is self-created; it does not owe its existence to the initiative of any organized Church, though it has the cordial support of all non-Roman Christendom, and has had firm friends both in Archbishop Davidson and the present Archbishop of Canterbury. It has been forced into being by the pressure of events and by the world problems which for the past generation have pressed themselves upon its promoters with ever increasing urgency.

What is to be its future? Its work has now grown to a point at which we are bound to take notice of it and form an opinion upon its nature and aims. (1) Is it filling a gap in the work of the Church? (2) Is it or is it not in the stream of Catholic development? When we come to consider all the facts I believe that we shall find that the answer to both these questions is in the affirmative.

I

"Go ye into all the world," said our Lord. As soon as we try to extend our outlook and have world aims we are inevitably brought up against the greatest of all hindrances to the life of the Church. As the missionary spirit increases and the mighty forces against us tower up in opposition the deadly weakness of our battle array makes itself felt with intolerable insistence. *We are divided.* The forces against us are world forces; they appear in different shapes in different parts of the world, but beneath their diversity there is one great sinister world force identical in all races and in all lands which cannot be attacked piecemeal. It is common to call that force by the name of Secular Civilization—that is, the attempt of man to build up his life and shape his progress by his own unaided effort and to ignore God. St. John calls it Antichrist, and there is a very modern ring in his words in his first Epistle: "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God: and this is that spirit of Antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now, already is it in the world." But Antichrist cannot be destroyed in sections. Only the united force of the Catholic Church

can stand up to the foe, and of late we have been losing ground. Much of the talent, the honesty, the devotion, the high aspiration in the life of mankind is enlisted against us. And the battle will go against us more and more as long as we present a divided front.

It is in the Mission Field that this paralyzing hindrance is most bitterly felt; no wonder the demand for reunion comes most urgently—even fiercely—from the young native Churches. We cannot but sympathise with their demand.

And yet—reunion is not to be reached by short cuts. Christendom now comprises many organized bodies or Churches, each built upon a particular, albeit partial, view of Catholic Faith and Order, and each with perhaps centuries of theology behind it. These bodies cannot come together in the near future. The Church must go on for generations, perhaps for centuries, without complete reunion.

And the world problems will not wait for us. If we are unable to grapple with them in some effective manner now, they will settle themselves, and the settlement in every case will probably be to the detriment of the cause of Christ and His Church. What are we to do? In the natural course of events, if the Catholic Church were one and undivided, nothing would be simpler than to appoint a Commission or Council representing the whole Church to be the official Council of Reference and Direction for the solution of all these problems. Rome, always unrivalled in its organization, has such a body in the Congregation of Propaganda. But the rest of Christendom, scattered and broken, has no means of appointing any representative institution at all. If the situation is to be saved, it must be saved by private initiative and by voluntary self-appointed institutions.

II

But we ought to make sure about these "world problems." What is meant by them? Are they what they are represented to be? And is there after all any machinery already in existence for dealing with them? They may be classed under four heads.

1. There are the questions raised in every non-Christian land about the nature of the Church, and the strange phenomenon of a score of Christian Missions preaching the same message, but mutually independent and often hostile. It is a most significant fact that throughout the whole world the native Christians in heathen lands express their utter detestation of these divisions, and show by their actions that they do not intend to be saddled with the quarrels of European Christians. They have their

own burdens to bear: everywhere they are fighting for the very life of their infant Church against the tremendous odds of the non-Christian majority around them, and they simply cannot afford to divide their little forces. It is difficult to over-rate this driving force for unity which comes from the Mission Field.

But the impetus of this force will certainly over-reach itself unless there is some moderating influence. Little local bodies will patch up their differences without regard to the great principles which the experience of centuries has taught the Catholic Church to observe. There is great need of some centralized influence, some agreed Headquarters to which reference may be made for advice, and information given. It is necessary to say here that the International Missionary Council has no authority whatever to direct any movements for reunion, nor does it aspire to anything of the kind. But nevertheless the existence of such a body does indirectly serve as a drag upon hasty action by local bodies, for it inevitably sheds the light of publicity upon the acts of all its constituents.

2. In the sphere of Education, again, there are world problems for the Christian Church. One of the striking facts of the new world situation is the establishment in virtually all non-European countries of State Departments of Education upon modern European lines. This is true of Japan, China, Corea, Siam, India, Persia, Turkey, Egypt, and other countries too numerous to name. Young men and women educated in British or American Universities come back to their native land determined to raise the educational standard to the highest European level. And the standard is indeed steadily rising. The Missionary Educational institutions in all non-Christian countries date from before this new awakening: and by comparison they begin to show up badly. Some of their teachers and College professors are judged to be below the mark: their curriculum is antiquated, their apparatus inadequate.

Now the object in Christian education is not to compete with the State, but to impregnate the State system with Christian principles and to secure safeguards for definite Christian teaching within the system. But the door will be closed everywhere unless the Christian Church can somehow so raise its educational standards as to present a worthy and acceptable offer to the State Department. But how can a score of separate struggling schools or colleges—all starving for want of money—bring their institutions up to standard? It can only be done by co-operation among the Missions of all denominations of a thorough, far-reaching character. For the sake of the common cause we must pool our educational resources.

But who can promote so great a work? Christian educa-

tional institutions are scattered all over Asia and Africa. They are independent and self-governing: and the action to be taken must be on a voluntary basis. Here again there must be some centralized initiative, some bureau of reference and counsel.

3. Next, there is the complicated and urgent question of Religious Freedom. Christianity has now become sufficiently important in all non-Christian countries to attract the attention of the Government. And official action varies very greatly in different States. In some cases missionaries are threatened with exclusion from the country, in others attempts are made to prohibit Christian teaching in Missionary Schools. Again there are attempts in some Mohammedan countries to enforce the law whereby children may not forsake the religion of their parents. The whole situation needs careful and comprehensive treatment: the facts of each case must be known; the methods of approach to different governments must be studied. There should be a unity of policy on the part of the Christian forces throughout the world, and the institution dealing with the matter should have something of an ecumenical status.

4. One more class of world problems calls for attention. Industrialism, as we all know, is spreading to all countries with disconcerting speed. And if we cannot closely follow the spread of industrialism with moral influences we shall see all the evils we have known in Europe multiplied a hundredfold in the non-Christian world. Here again someone must take the initiative; and there is no ecumenical body formally recognized. A single instance will illustrate the need. In Northern Rhodesia and in Belgian Congo great mineral deposits have just been discovered and great companies have been formed, commanding millions of capital, for the development of these areas. Half a million male native labourers will be required, or thereabouts, in each area. It will easily be seen what great possibilities for evil are here involved both to the men themselves, separated for months in the year from their womenkind, and the kraals which they will leave, depopulated of the able-bodied males. The promoters of the companies are fully alive to the danger, and so are the Government officials, and they will welcome with both hands the help of Christian influences wisely applied and working in co-operation with them. But the thing is too big for any one Mission to undertake. Some central initiative is required from which co-operation may be developed among all the Missions concerned. Similar illustrations, though hardly on so large a scale, might be given from other parts of the world. There is need everywhere to encourage unity of understanding and co-operation between the three great agencies for the development of the backward races—i.e.,

the political officer, the trader and the missionary. And there is no organized Church authority to supply the need on the Christian side.

III

It is to supply this vast but elusive demand of the present world situation that the International Missionary Council has come into existence. Already it has shown its capacity to handle these questions. Is it not possible for the organized Churches of Christendom to recognize this venture and support it as at least an interim expedient in the present distress? Practically all non-Roman Churches do. But the Church of England has hardly yet awakened to the situation.

Three considerations must no doubt be borne in mind in forming our judgment:

1. Its value has been tested so far in strictly practical directions. It has proved itself capable of handling certain practical demands and problems. It must keep to this limited sphere. The cobbler must stick to his last. If at any time the International Missionary Council were to begin to usurp the functions of an authoritative Committee of the Catholic Church it would thereupon begin to fail. But there is not the slightest inclination that way.

2. If it is to do, however humbly, a portion of the work which properly belongs to a united Catholic Church, it must itself maintain a grasp of main Catholic principles. In a body representing all denominations of non-Roman Christendom there is always a danger lest the more difficult and less obvious lessons of corporate Christian experience should be allowed to fall into desuetude. Where feeling is intense, as it always is (thank God) where World Evangelization is concerned, it is only too easy to contract the outlook and lose sight of the background of the Divine purpose for the whole Church. It is here that Anglicanism has a great contribution to offer. If we Anglicans throw ourselves in heartily with this great movement, we shall be welcomed with open arms, and our influence will tell with potent force. If we hold aloof through ignorance or any weak fears for our Catholicity, we may miss a glorious opportunity and may perchance be found failing our Lord and Master in His purpose for His Church.

3. And, incidentally, the International Missionary Council may prove a decisive factor in the long labour for reunion. The common hunger of Christendom is expressed in part through the World Conference on Faith and Order. For we all know that careful and patient work is needed to bring our differences

out into the open and to make sure of the foundations of our agreement. But it is hard uphill work and there are signs sometimes of weariness in the quest. There is need of the constant stimulus of reality lest the discussion upon Faith and Order should relapse into academic irrelevance. The International Missionary Council can supply the driving force of reality. With its close touch with every Mission Field the Council finds itself constantly goaded to sorrow and indignation at the shame and pity of it all. When we ought to be a great army marching to victory we are despised and helpless through our divisions: and all the time the wonders which we see in the Mission Field are calling us to ever greater ventures of faith.

The Committee of the Council at Herrnhut decided to approach the World Conference on Faith and Order in the hope that some co-operation might be possible. Cool thought and passionate hunger must be wedded in the work for reunion. After the spirit of wonder, the Church needs the spirit of hunger. After the contemplation of the Incarnation, the Church must turn with passionate zeal to make the Great Thing known to mankind. It is in this sacred quest that we are met with difficulties: let us face them with holy resolve. And I believe we shall all find that in that task the International Missionary Council is a God-given instrument ready to our hand.

STCLAIR SARUM.

NOTES

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

CONSEQUENT upon our discussion of Dr. Nygren's book, *Agape and Eros*, in last month's THEOLOGY, it has been pointed out to us by a correspondent that Fr. Hebert, in his preface to the book, had forestalled our principal criticism, but had pointed out that the author's purpose was simply to investigate the two terms and set their meanings side by side. The *caveat* is important; and we had ourselves mentioned the fact that the volume before us was only the first of two. Nevertheless, even an objective comparison of ideas reveals a point of view; and it was this which we felt, and feel, needs to be balanced by other considerations.

CORRESPONDENCE

DEAR SIR,

In reading the Rev. R. H. Moberly's sermon on the Doctrine of the Trinity in this month's issue of THEOLOGY I took particular notice of his remark to the effect that as far as his own knowledge goes "Christian Art has instinctively avoided attempting to portray the Holy Spirit in human form." It may be of interest to you to know that a short time ago I was shown a small picture representing all Three Persons of the Trinity in the form of three human figures identical, so far as I can remember, in every way. I am afraid I can give no details as to authorship or source. The picture was shown to me by the Rev. J. A. R. Derham-Marshall of St. Margaret's, Princes Road, Liverpool, and as far as I know is still in his possession.

I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,

(REV.) CYRIL T. H. DAMS.

10 THE CLOISTERS,
WINDSOR CASTLE,
October 5, 1932.

NOTES

I.—GUNKEL ON THE PSALMS.

A BRIEF note appeared in our columns in April, 1926, dealing with H. Gunkel's great Commentary on the Psalms (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht). Further comment was reserved until the promised Introduction should be published. The first part of this, published in 1928, was sent for review but not noticed at the time in the hope of having the entire work to discuss before long. The author's recent death has frustrated this hope. But a summary of the main results published in 1928 may be useful.

1. The Psalms are exceptionally difficult of interpretation, since poetry is intrinsically indefinite and allusive; the Hebrew tenses do not record

past and future in our Western sense; and there is no trustworthy tradition as to the origin of the separate psalms, which, moreover, are often textually corrupt and have been subjected to rearrangements.

The Psalm-form has 2,000 years' history in the Near East and is correspondingly complicated. We must first establish the different species, remembering that in a primitive people these will originate in the different occasions of life. Songs of worship come first. They accompany actions before God, as in the Song of the Digging of the Well (Numbers xxi. 17); music and (what we should call secular) action went together. In antiquity all solemn utterances were rhythmical in form, of necessity if they were to be repeated by a multitude.

2. Hymns generally begin with an imperative introduction—"sing," "praise," etc.—often repeated in the course of the hymn and at the end. Sometimes we have a cohortative—"let us sing" etc.; the choir is here addressing itself. Frequently actions are specified—"clap hands," "fall down," "enter the gates"—to be taken literally. "I will sing" points to a solo, as does the imperative, chanted by the leader.

The main part of the hymn follows, often introduced by "for," or a relative clause, as in Egyptian and Babylonian hymns. The subject is Yahweh, His qualities, His mighty deeds, His sanctuary. The hymns show the spiritual side of the feasts and the enthusiasm for Yahweh which arose as new sides of His nature were discovered.

Other classes of psalms are the Thanksgiving of the individual (who invites others to join his feast), Lamentations, Songs of Victory, and Liturgies, i.e. mixed pieces sung by different voices.

3. A very interesting class is formed by the Songs of Yahweh's Accession, such as xciii., xcvii., xcix. (In the Hebrew, "the LORD is King" refers to a definite action, "hath taken His seat"). The psalmist will have spiritualized the court procedure at the coronation and enthronization of the Hebrew king; under prophetic influence the semi-divine honours paid by flattering court poets, imitating Egyptian and Babylonian prototypes, were transferred to the invisible King.*

4. Lamentations of the Nation (e.g., xlv., lxxiv., lxxix., lxxx., lxxxiii.) were composed for fasts in time of trouble, such as pestilence, drought, locusts, or invasion. The people came to a sanctuary and wept, clothed in sackcloth. "We" in such psalms means Israel. Indeed the Hebrews used "I" for an individual's, "we" for a corporate, utterance. To suppose that "I" in the Psalms means the community is a serious error. Note that in Jeremiah's laments "I" is the prophet. The Babylonian practice in such cases is to use "I" corporately, the King speaking for his people.

5. Royal Psalms have been much debated. Since the Hebrews had kings it is natural to suppose that they are referred to, and especially the Kings of Judah. Court songs form the basis of these psalms, which came in with the foreign influences of David's and Solomon's reigns. No names except David's are mentioned, so we have the ideal king represented. The State is conceived religiously and the king is in specially close relation to God. He is the priest of Sion, and his eternal life is prayed for. He cannot be identified with the Messiah, prayers for whom would be out of

* Psalm xlv. is often thought to have been originally an *epithalamium* for Jezebel's marriage. Gunkel emends "ivory palaces" of v. 8 to "ivory instruments." A member of the expedition excavating Samaria tells me that this year (1932) remnants of the ivory panelling on the walls of Ahab's palace were found.

place. As the Son of God, the King is depicted as world-ruler. His martial exploits are exaggerated. All this is paralleled in Egyptian and Babylonian psalms.*

The Maccabæan origin of such psalms is excluded by the evidence of the Septuagint and by the fact that the Maccabæan kings were not of Davidic origin.

This brief sketch may serve to show the unique originality and richness of Gunkel's exegesis.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

II.—TOWARDS BETTER PREACHING.

There are many difficulties in the way of effective modern preaching, and yet it is the writer's belief that the pulpit can be made much more effective than it is nowadays. The main difficulties are concerned with the Preacher, the Sermon, and the Hearers.

First the Preacher. Here the main difficulty is that we preach too much to be at our best all the time. There are so many parochial activities taking up our time and energy that we rarely can read and think deeply enough to get to close grips with some of the modern problems that are troubling not a few of our people. Thus we merely scratch the surface of as many of them as we can in the course of a year, and so give rise to the easily uttered taunt that the clergy are either burying their heads in the sands of obscurantism, or are being to some extent intellectually dishonest.

Then the Sermon. Here we find that modern conditions produce two main defects. First, there is little, if any, cohesion or link of thought between one Sunday's sermon and that of the previous or following Sunday. The result is that, over any given year, we find many subjects totally neglected, while others have perhaps been given undue prominence. Secondly, our sermons are, on the whole, too long, for the simple reason that the lack of time mentioned above prevents us from isolating our subject-matter within clearly defined boundaries. The art of effective preaching is bound up with the art of selection; and this latter art demands the very thing we do not possess—namely, time for quiet and searching thought.

Finally, our Hearers. Here the main difficulty is that we have to preach, at any one given time, to a congregation composed of people at all stages of the spiritual life, of people with varying mental capacities, with diverse interests and habits of life, and with many subtle combinations of temperament. The gamut of modern life is much wider than it was fifty years ago, while from the modern Press there stream forth chromatic smatterings of half-truths on spiritual and moral questions which tend to produce discord in the ears of the very elect.

The present writer thinks that most of these difficulties can be overcome by some application of the following suggestions. First, we should recognize three main types of sermons. One of these will be the *intensive* type—subjects concerning the inner life, questions of moral and ascetical theology, teachings on the deeper benefits of Holy Communion, for

* But in post-exilic times, when the Psalter assumed its present form, the earthly king and the Messiah would merge into each other.

example—which should be confined to the special services for guilds or parochial organizations. That these are treated too lightly today is surely a truism. In these smaller gatherings we eliminated much of the diversity of the general congregation, for they are composed nearly always of regular communicants who have made some progress. Then, if they are asked to sit together—either in a roped-off portion of the nave or in some side chapel—we make for better conditions of reception.

Another type would be the *extensive*, used mainly on Sunday evenings. This type seeks to cover more ground without attempting to go deeply into things, and seeks to attract further enquiry by showing the superiority of the Christian *ethos*. The method will be dramatic and forceful, and the preacher will do well to remember that an apt illustration taken from the lives of the hearers—and hence the necessity of parochial visitation—will do more to convert people than the most logical of arguments.

The third type of sermon would be the *dogmatic or practical* (since it must have a name), confined to Sunday mornings at the Sung Eucharist or High Mass. Its aim would be to stir up a more fervent love for God through dwelling on the Christian Mysteries, and to get our people to see that this increased love for God should issue in greater missionary endeavour amongst their compeers. It is important that our congregation be told that there are these three distinct types of preaching and instruction.

To the objection that this means more, and not less, preparation on the part of the preacher, it may be replied that there is no reason—other than lack of humility on the part of the priest—why the “addresses” at guild meetings should take the form of a sermon at all. The reading of some book chapter by chapter, supplemented by explanations from the reader, will provide both priest and people with a much-needed variety and relief, and will also give some continuity to successive meetings of the guild. At the end of the session the name of the book can be given out, and the priest can offer to obtain copies for those who will buy it. It will be found that a fair proportion of the people will take advantage of this offer, and so the lessons will sink in even more deeply through the repetition involved in the reading. There are many excellent booklets published nowadays which could serve an admirable purpose if used in this way.

The difficulty of the long sermon, especially when the subject is a big one, may be obviated by making more use than we do of *courses of sermons*. Why should these be confined almost entirely to Advent or Lent? Courses of three, four, or more sermons can often be introduced at other seasons of the year, and the general subjects can often be arranged for a year in advance. This, again, makes for continuity and ensures a better-balanced presentation of the main truths of the Christian Faith; while the repetition involved in the short *résumé* of what has preceded any given sermon is, again, a distinct aid to memory for the people.

Further, it might well be arranged at certain definite times to have a public catechizing after Evensong. Our faithful people could easily be persuaded to take part in some such scheme and to answer set questions with set answers. This should have a great attraction if it were advertised, and might result in much good to the parish.

Finally—and for consideration of this suggestion the writer pleads most strongly—could not the Way of Renewal lead towards a plan for more effective preaching? We have come to think of the Rural Deanery

as a unit in a great scheme of corporate prayer and study. This movement has undoubtedly brought the clergy closer together than they have been for a very long time. Could not, therefore, each Ruridecanal Chapter organize a scheme of pulpit exchanges along the following lines? Let each priest who wishes to join in with the plan select some special subject such as the Atonement, the Person of our Lord, the Sacraments, etc. Then let him, after some special reading, submit to an "Exchange Secretary" of the Chapter the number of sermons he needs in order to give his subject adequate treatment. The secretary will then prepare a list of special preachers, subjects, and the number of sermons required, and send them to all members of the Chapter. By this means any priest will be able to invite another priest to come and speak on any of these particular subjects; in fact, he will have at his disposal much better thought and preparation than he could possibly give to every subject himself. Such a plan should be extremely beneficial to the whole Deanery; it should help to raise the standard of preaching and teaching, and it should pass on to the laity some at least of the results of the Way of Renewal. Is it not simply an application of the principle of specialization which should go a long way towards counteracting the drawbacks of the same principle as seen in the thoughts of many of our people?

There remains one benefit of such a scheme which must be mentioned,—indeed, it is justification in itself. Would it not be, under God, a great means of bringing together those who in our Church are at present divided by "party" representations of the truth? It would certainly bring in a more charitable spirit, and the lesson would not be wasted on the laity. It is true that there are many non-controversial subjects which might provide a useful basis for this "exchange" system. But why stop there? The present writer is deeply convinced that there is a far greater agreement between Catholic, Evangelical, and Modernist Anglicans than can find expression under our present conditions. The case for each "party" contains two elements, a positive and a negative. So that, if the pulpits could be exchanged on the basis of some such plan as has been outlined above, and if the various preachers confined themselves to the positive side of their position, surely both the preachers and the hearers would be considerably edified. The trouble is that nowadays, through the medium of the Press, we hear of nothing but the differences which exist between various members of our Church. When a speaker says, "I believe," he is not worth much as "copy." But as soon as he says "I don't believe," he secures a column or two. We will never reach a true unity in the Anglican Communion until each party sees that it has no monopoly of the truth, and until we refrain from attacking the other man whose true position is one about which we probably know very little. So, in a scheme of pulpit exchange such as is here suggested, might not each preacher, deliberately approaching his subject and determined to find agreements rather than differences, find himself used by the Holy Spirit of God towards a healing of our wounds? And would not his preaching, and therefore the whole Church, thereby benefit?

R. H. LE MESSURIER.

III.—A DIALOGUE IN ELYSIUM

A Materialist Professor of Science of the nineteenth century is in the Elysian Fields. There he encounters, accidentally, a Modernist Ecclesiastical Dignitary of the twentieth century. The former has grey side-whiskers, and wears a black frock-coat and top hat. The latter is arrayed in the panoply of his office. They recline upon the grass, surrounded by Elysian daffodils.

PROFESSOR. I am delighted to meet you. I came here in 1880, and now, in 1932, you have just arrived. Pray tell me how you were getting on with the Theory of Evolution when you left.

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. With the greatest pleasure. We have taken it over. The Theory of Evolution is now one of our strongholds.

PROFESSOR. You astonish me! Please let me know how that has come about.

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. Of course we have modified it. As for the Theory that you left, well, *nous avons changé tout cela*. Your enthusiasm carried you too far. We now find what we call Creative or Emergent Evolution, where you saw no more than the uniformity of nature. Now, as in your day, Evolutionary Science shows us a world that is essentially one of advancing greatness, a world ever moving towards higher and richer forms of life. But you failed to see that the progressive emergence of higher forms argued the continuous operation of a Creative Mind. The new hypothesis is to the effect that the process of advance is purposive, not merely the result of the blind action of variation and survival. We regard the survival of the fittest as an insufficient explanation of the observed facts.

PROFESSOR. You astonish me more and more! And the miraculous element in your Creed?

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. We are no longer much concerned about the miracles. Indeed, we regard the evolutionary process itself as one that is essentially miraculous. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural is fading away: we find that it is unsound. The whole process of Evolution is itself a Revelation.

PROFESSOR. Well! Looking at the matter from your own point of view, I suppose you are compelled to find teleological purpose somehow. But, after all, what you offer me is no more than Paley *redivivus*! No matter. Pray proceed.

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. From the Revelation that we see in the evolutionary process, we infer a Divine Immanence in the universe. In that thought we find the most splendid and suggestive conception of God. His immanence is ever before our eyes.

PROFESSOR. Your views appear to me to be emotional rather than rational. But we will not pursue the subject. Pray tell me how they are getting on in Physics.

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. Gladly. I have studied the subject rather carefully, and it gives me peculiar pleasure to enlighten you. Physical Science has also undergone a transformation. The change is one that gives us no less satisfaction than that which we derive from the altered outlook in Evolution. The atom, the homogeneous, indestructible atom that you knew, the atom that ruled all things and formed the physical basis of your philosophy, has totally disappeared. It is now recognized

as an exceedingly complex electrical structure. It is neither homogeneous nor indestructible.

PROFESSOR (*gasping*). What!

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. Even that is not all. Within the complexities of the atom what is called "indeterminacy" is found to prevail. There, in the very basis of all things, Chance reigns supreme. Fortuity has taken the place of causation. And, now that causation no longer rules, we find that the orderly nature of our surroundings is no more than the statistical average of an inconceivably vast number of events taking place within the atom.

PROFESSOR. I am speechless! Has everything gone? Has even the Second Law of Thermodynamics perished? or is that saved from the wreck?

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. Upon that point I can reassure you. That Law is safe beyond peradventure. There is a slight change in terminology to adjust it to the new conditions, but that is all. You used to speak of the Dissipation of Energy: it is now called the Increase of the Entropy, but it means the same thing. It means that it is only when heat passes from a hot body to a colder one that you can get mechanical work. We still find that the process is an irreversible one. In performing work, heat is lost for ever. The heat that the sun, for instance, radiates into space acts by raising the general temperature, and then is lost irrecoverably. Thus, in an irreversible system, the total amount of energy available for work is always tending towards exhaustion. The universe lives upon its capital. Conversely, the amount of lost, irrecoverable energy (we call it the entropy) is always tending towards a maximum. The universe is running down into heat that is uniformly distributed, and therefore not available as a source of work. The universe, therefore, must become eventually motionless and dead. A time is approaching when all movement, life, and beauty will have utterly passed away.

PROFESSOR. What, then, becomes of your Immanent God? What happens to Him whom you have identified as organic with His universe?

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MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. I perceive that I must postulate, not the Immanence, but the Transcendence of God. For it is manifest that if, at some period not infinitely remote in the future, the universe will stand still like a clock that has run down, then, at some period not infinitely remote in the past, that clock must have been wound up. Again I see creative power and the hand of God.

PROFESSOR. Pardon me. Have you considered the implications of the cosmology that you now propose? Your clock was wound up: by a certain definite act, that is, Creation took place. Your clock was started in possession of its maximum of energy, and, since then, has been running down. Your clock, however, does not furnish an accurate analogy with what is going on in the universe. A clock stops suddenly. A universe in which the Dissipation of Energy (or Increase of the Entropy—call it which you will) is taking place differs in that respect. A wound-up universe, in which the Dissipation of Energy goes on continuously, does not fail suddenly. It slows down uniformly from the first day to the last. The failure is gradual. Such a universe operates more and more slowly: in proportion as its capital is diminished, so it is spent with less and less profusion. The process is one of steady degeneration, a degeneration

which proceeds with a speed that decreases regularly. From first to last, such a universe will manifest the phenomena of decline.

MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. And then ?

PROFESSOR. Then, I ask you, what of your ascending process of Evolution ? When we speak of Evolution it is common ground to us to see a world that is essentially one of ascending greatness, a world ever moving upwards. As students of evolution we interpret the facts differently, but we see the same facts. You must not ignore the facts of Evolution any more than the facts of Physics. And you cannot square those that are revealed by evolutionary science with those that are revealed by physical science. So far as your inferences are concerned, they stand in flat contradiction: the one shows anabolism, the other shows katabolism.

When you asked me to apprehend a Godhead that was Immanent, I pointed to the facts of physical science. If, now, you ask me to apprehend a Godhead that is Transcendent, then I point to the facts of evolutionary science. You cannot base your theology upon both at once, for the evidence given by the one cannot be reconciled with that which is given by the other. Nor can you base your theology upon either of them alone, for, if you do so, then the other bears witness against you. Remember, moreover, that the evidence of each is as weighty as that of the other. Until you have shown either, upon the one hand, that the ascending growth revealed throughout the universe by the evolutionary process is fallacious, or, upon the other hand, that the downward tendency revealed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics is illusory, no case has been proved, and I will grant neither of your inferences.

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MODERNIST ECCLESIASTIC. What, then, of your own position ? Where do you stand ? What is the worth of your science if it ends in a blind alley of contradictions ?

PROFESSOR. My position is exclusively scientific. I do not go beyond the facts. To me, the contradiction is immaterial, and the resolution of it is a matter of indifference. But to you, as a theologian, the case is different, for I assume that you are compelled to draw an inference one way or the other. To you, then, the resolution of the dilemma is a matter of vital importance.

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TOGETHER. How opportune ! Here comes the Great Lawgiver: let us invite him to adjudicate.

Very humbly they approach MOSES, and beg him to join them. He consents to do so, and the conversation is recounted to him.

MOSES. Between three and four thousand years ago, when my people and I were surrounded by the desert, we abjured idolatry. No longer would we worship any deity whose likeness could be perceived in heaven above, or earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. No longer would we worship any deity who was regarded as the embodiment, the image, of any of the powers or the processes of nature. No longer, that is, would we base our thought of the Most High upon such conceptions as the Laws of Physics or the working of an Evolutionary Process. Those conceptions belong to a category of ideas that was specifically excluded from our theology. Thereupon any such qualification as "immanent" or "transcendent" became repellent to us as a limitation, a circumscription, of His infinitude. We were bidden to know Him as I AM THAT I AM, and to add no more.

ARTHUR JOHN HUBBARD, M.D.

REVIEW

A HISTORY OF ISRAEL. Vol. I. FROM THE EXODUS TO THE FALL OF JERUSALEM, 586 B.C. By Theodore H. Robinson, D.D. Pp. xiv+496 with 11 maps. Vol. II. FROM THE FALL OF JERUSALEM, 586 B.C., TO THE BAR-KOKHBA REVOLT, A.D. 135. By W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D. Pp. viii+500 with 11 maps. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1932. Each vol. 15s.

The publication of this work will mark an era in English O.T. scholarship. For many years students, as well as the general body of educated readers, have been waiting and longing for a standard history of Israel in English which should embody in a readable form the results of the mass of detailed discussion of the O.T. records which has been going on for more than 100 years. It is not surprising that we have had to wait so long for such a work. For alongside of the literary discussions of the Hebrew sources which have since Wellhausen continuously and in ever-increasing volume poured from the press, there has been from time to time brought to light an enormous mass of archaeological evidence, generally elucidating—sometimes obscuring—the ancient written records, but which had to be coordinated with them. So we went on still waiting and hoping for the advent of the right man or men who should possess the knowledge, the critical judgment, the historic tact, and the impulse to weld this mass of intractable materials into a literary whole. It is not surprising that the announcement made at the meeting in December, 1928, of the Society for Old Testament Study, that the work was actually to be undertaken by two eminent scholars of unquestioned fitness to carry it out, raised and has ever since maintained the most pleasing anticipations of the result. Let us hasten to add that these anticipations will be found to be fully realized in the book before us. Here is the Englishman's history of Israel in two handsome volumes, well arranged, well referenced, with Additional Notes on important points, with full indexes of Biblical References, Authors Cited, and General; and in Vol. II., in addition, Sources and Selected Bibliography, and both volumes containing a number of most useful sketch maps. The only criticism we can offer on the form of the work is as to the *Summaries* at the head of the chapters, which give this writer at least the uncomfortable sensation of reading everything twice over. But this is only a detail, and the form of the work generally is all that could be desired. It is not easy, in a short notice like this, to give any

adequate idea of the rich and varied contents of these books. As the two volumes are really separate works with very little overlapping, it will be most convenient to consider each in its turn. But one remark is common to both. As the authors have already published a work on Hebrew Religion, they have felt it advisable to reduce the discussion of that subject to a minimum to prevent the expansion of the book to inordinate size. This does not mean that this topic is neglected (see I. 14 and 404-8; II. 166-8, 306-10, etc.), but that it is treated with brevity.

Vol. I. (Robinson) extends from the Exodus to the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. It is a pleasant book to read, written in the clear and easy style characteristic of the author, full of knowledge, "crowded with culture." We are impressed with the sober good sense with which so many thorny questions are discussed, and in most cases feel content with the solutions offered. And we are delighted to note the absence from these pages of many wild theories which at various times have darkened counsel rather than shed light on the subject (see for specimens p. 101, n. 6, p. 451, n. 1), and of violent emendation of the text. And it is with entire sympathy that we have read these wise words: "It may seem to some readers that in the earlier part of the book I have given too much weight to the Biblical narratives. It may be true that these narratives in their present form do not go further back than the period of the Monarchy, but they are certainly based on traditions which are much older. The traditions themselves are facts. To the scientific mind every fact requires an explanation, and the simplest and most obvious explanation of a tradition is an event," etc. (Preface, p. x). The tradition must, of course, be thoroughly criticized so that it may yield what it has to give (see, e.g., pp. 50 f.) This method of critical conservatism is the note of the book and gives it much of its value and charm.

We have noted a long list of places where we should like to consider at length Dr. Robinson's conclusions. This is, of course, quite impossible—the notice would be as long as the book. But we think most readers would wish to know how he deals with the complicated subject of the *Exodus*, at once the most important and the most difficult question in Hebrew history (chap. v., pp. 68 f). After laying down that "it is quite impossible to deny either the fact of the Exodus or the historicity of Moses," but that "the actual date of the Exodus and even the identification of an approximate period may never certainly be attained," possible periods are discussed.

(a) The story which Josephus quotes from Manetho, which was adopted by the late Dr. H. R. Hall, that Israel left Egypt

with the Hyksos in the sixteenth century, cannot be accepted. This departure of the Hyksos may rather mark the beginning of the *oppression*.

(b) The view based on Exodus i., "that Ramses II., the builder of Pithom and Ramses, was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and his son Merneptah the Pharaoh of the Exodus, once the dominant view and still largely held (*cf.* Lods, *Israel*, pp. 196 f.), is also rather summarily rejected.

(c) A date earlier than (b) is suggested by the following phenomena: The Exodus was only possible at a period of Egyptian weakness, when that nation was too much occupied at home to pay attention to Palestine; the Merneptah *stele* points to an "Israel" already settled in that land; inscriptions of Seti I. and Ramses II. find an "Asher" in Northern Palestine; allusions to the Habiri in the Tell el Amarna letters may possibly refer to some portions of Israel; the Philistines as a nation settled in Palestine (p. 43) do not appear in Israelite tradition till the time of Samson (p. 153).

(d) Having rejected (a) and (b), this leaves only the eighteenth dynasty, and two periods, 1600-1480 or 1380-1300, are suggested. Dr. Robinson leans to the latter date, but very wisely does not make any final decision.

On another subject of vital interest and importance—the date of Deuteronomy and the reforms of Josiah based upon it (pp. 417-24 and Additional Note F)—it has given us and will, we think, give many readers much satisfaction to note that Dr. Robinson (with Gressmann and Budde) maintains the traditional view and rejects the elaborate but unconvincing theory of Hölcher. There are very few important points in which we differ from Dr. Robinson's conclusions. We shall only name one which relates to *Levi*. His view is that "the original tribe of Levi vanished at a very early date, though the name was preserved in that of the professional priests who developed into an hereditary ecclesiastical body and ultimately ranked as a tribe, perhaps through its similarity to one of the Semite words for 'priest'" (pp. 60-61, 80, and n. 2). We have never been able to accept this theory; our reasons were set out in the *Holborn Review*, April, 1927, pp. 181-3 (see also Kittel, *Gesch.*, I. v., vi., 372-3; Lods, *Israel*, pp. 511-12). We venture to express the hope that the opinion expressed by Dr. Robinson may receive reconsideration in future editions of this work.

Volume II. (Oesterley) embraces the period from the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C., to the Bar-Kochba Revolt, A.D. 135. In fact, it goes farther back, beginning with the Fall of Nineveh in 612. This long stretch of time really contains many periods—the Babylonian deportations and exile, the Persian, the

Greek and the Roman eras—each with its own sources and special difficulties. No attempt to give a complete history of Israel during this long period has been made in English on this scale since the old days of Milman, and few indeed are the scholars who could have faced the task. The knowledge required is stupendous, and the difficulties caused by the state of the authorities are very great. Dr. Oesterley himself has stated some of them thus: "The latter half of the fifth century B.C. is among the most difficult and complicated periods in the history of Israel. The data are scanty, often obscure, and at times evidently contradictory; sometimes we are led to suspect deliberate modification in the text of our documents in the interests of theological or ecclesiastical theory. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the opinions of scholars differ sometimes widely; no two have succeeded in presenting quite the same reconstruction of actual events" (Preface, p. viii). Through this tangled mass of defective authorities and conflicting opinions Dr. Oesterley pursues his way with a sure mastery of his materials and a most careful criticism of them. His methods are almost judicial in their calm sobriety and patient investigation. He views the history of Israel as "no longer the record of the fortunes of a political entity; it concerns the development of certain moral and spiritual concepts embodied in a group which had a strong national self-consciousness" (Preface). We are much impressed by the way in which he illustrates and vitalizes his narrative by judicious citation from contemporary prophets (pp. 25 f., 42 f., 53 f., etc.). Especially valuable are the Additional Notes B (Isa. lvi.-lxvi. and Malachi), D (Zech. ix. 1-8, xi. 1-3), E (Zech. ix. 13-17 and ix. 9-12), F (Zech., various passages), G (Zech. xiv. 6-9). There is still considerable controversy, and we may have our doubts as to the correct dating of some of these prophetic passages, especially in Trito-Isaiah and Zechariah, but on the whole the method is fruitful. Dr. Oesterley has been able to gain from these sources much that is of great historical value both for fact and illustration. We find ourselves entirely in sympathy with his wise words as to tradition: "Their (the Jews') traditions are not founded on air—there is, at the least, a historic kernel always to be discerned in the traditions of their heroes which have been preserved, even though that kernel be no more than the simple fact that the hero was once a living man or a clan personified" (p. 138). This view is the same in effect as that of Dr. Robinson (*supra*), and in our opinion is the only foundation on which a satisfactory History of Israel at any period can be based.

In order to give some idea of the character of this work, we propose to indicate briefly some of the author's conclusions on

two difficult and much discussed questions as to the Return from the Captivity, and as to the Restoration of the Temple. In Ezra i. 2-4 is given a decree of Cyrus permitting the Babylonian exiles to return to Jerusalem and build the temple. In Ezra vi. 3-5 another version of this decree is given, very different in form, and written in Aramaic. Torrey and others have declared both the decree and the subsequent return of the Exiles under Cyrus to be fiction; Kittel (*Gesch.*, III. vi. 42) is disposed to accept the decree in Ezra vi. 3-5, and reject the one in Ezra i. 2-4. Dr. Oesterley prudently takes a middle course. He is of opinion that a decree of some sort was issued by Cyrus permitting the return of the Exiles, and that this was followed by the return of a certain number under Sheshbazzar (p. 77). A still greater difficulty arises as to the date when the building of the Temple began. In Ezra (iii. 8 f., v. 16) it is stated that the work was begun by Sheshbazzar in 537 B.C.; on the other hand, it would appear from Haggai i. and Zechariah that nothing of this kind had been done up to 520 B.C. Dr. Oesterley after a very careful discussion gives his view that, when the Exiles returned from Babylon, they found the Temple still standing, but in a dilapidated state; in spite of this, however, the worship of Yahweh was being carried on and the sacrifices were being offered on the sacred site where they had always been offered (see "the house of Yahweh," Jer. xli. 4-5; "this house," Hag. i. 4, ii. 3; "mine house lieth waste," Hag. i. 14; "the priests of the house of Yahweh," Zech. vii. 1 f.), and that this state of things lasted till 520 (pp. 89-94). We could quote any number of such examples of Dr. Oesterley's careful and learned handling of difficult problems of various kinds, but these must suffice. We can only just mention his brilliant chapters on the Maccabean Revolt and the Hasmonæan High Priesthood (chaps. xvi., xvii., xviii., xix., xx.), which any student of history could read with pleasure and profit, and the notes on the Jewish parties (Pharisees, etc., Additional Notes H and J). Many English readers have a very imperfect knowledge of the history of some of the periods covered by this volume. With Dr. Oesterley's book in their hands they will no longer have any excuse to offer for any such deficiency of knowledge.

These two volumes are a great achievement and will almost certainly become the standard History of Israel for English-speaking people. We hope that the clergy, all persons whose duty it is to teach the Old Testament, and all educated laymen will read this record of the marvellous way in which under Providential guidance a group of Aramean nomads was gradually fitted to become a community out of which could arise the religion of the Incarnation.

W. W. CANNON.

NOTICES

A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert.
Vol. I., Early and Eastern. Scribners, 12s. 6d.

Dr. McGiffert has given a masterly and very readable account of his great subject; in 332 pages he has succeeded in covering the ground with a wonderful fulness of detail. The volume contains the first two parts of his projected history, dealing with early thought from Jesus and His Apostles down to Irenæus and the Montanists, and Eastern thought from Clement of Alexandria to John of Damascus. The point of view is that of a very Liberal Protestantism; and many of the divergencies—often verbal—between early thinkers and what was afterwards known as the Catholic faith are unconsciously exaggerated. The author thinks of Jesus as a moral teacher, who shared the apocalyptic hopes of His age in their more spiritual form; and doubts whether He ever considered Himself to be the Messiah. We read (p. 5) that He was not pessimistic about human nature, and recognized virtue as a natural achievement, not a supernatural gift; but no references are given for this. St. Paul's "dualism" of flesh and spirit is greatly overpressed; we are told (p. 20) that he interpreted his vision near Damascus as "the vision of a divine being who had come down from heaven and assumed human flesh *and had laid it off again*" (no reference given). We are told that St. Paul did not accept the Resurrection of the Flesh; what he actually wrote was that "*flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*" (1 Cor. xv. 50). The Christian hope was based on the Resurrection of Jesus with His flesh and bones (St. Luke xxiv. 39), but not with His blood, which had been shed on the cross. On p. 22 we read that "Paul was dealing with real not legal categories"; but the distinction would have been almost meaningless to the Apostle. On pp. 28, 29 a very fine distinction is drawn between "ontological" and "epistemological" mysticism in SS. Paul and John; but it is more important to notice that for Dr. McGiffert mysticism is associated with the *via negativa* (see his chapter on Dionysius the Areopagite), not with the wider and healthier definition given in Dr. Inge's Bampton Lectures. The treatment of the relation of the Word to the Father is inadequate; *e.g.*, we are rightly told that Clement of Alexandria (unlike Origen) called the Logos *θεός* and *ὁ θεός*; but the distinction between the Greek phrases is not explained, and in the six pages devoted to St. John the first verse of the Prologue to the Gospel is not mentioned! The necessity for the doctrine of the Trinity is attributed (p. 275) to the contemporary dominance of the Platonic, rather than the Stoic, metaphysic; but Christianity was a religion before it was a philosophy, and its creed the statement of an historic experience of God rather than a metaphysical description of His nature; we cannot therefore be surprised to find that where the doctrine of the Incarnation is not accepted, that of the Holy Trinity makes no appeal.

J. H. McCUBBIN.

THE TEACHERS' COMMENTARY. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

One-volume commentaries upon the Bible are usually remarkable for their lack of one-ness and for the inadequacy of their comment for the purpose which they claim to fulfil: many justify their title chiefly by their

voluminousness. It is therefore refreshing to find an exception in the case of the *Teachers' Commentary* recently published by the Student Christian Movement. Here a most variegated assortment of writers, of all schools of thought and consisting of lay as well as professional theologians, combine to produce a notable unity, not only of treatment, but also of exegesis. In spite of the perhaps justifiable omission of controversial subjects, and a rigorous confinement to those parts of the Scriptures which seem to lend themselves more particularly to the instruction of the young, the result of their labours is a commentary in many ways excellent for its purpose. Further, although not the canonical Scriptures only, but the apocryphal as well, are dealt with, the whole work is contained in 430 pages of an attractively printed, light, and handy royal octavo.

Naturally one takes up such a book as this with some anxiety as to the theological and doctrinal colour. Let it be said at once that there is little here to dismay either the orthodox or the modernist. On the whole the position is more conservative than one might expect. The fact is that the writers hold themselves down to the rigorous annotation of their text, and point to the significances of their material without forming judgments upon it.

It would be too much to expect of human beings, however, that this commendable discretion should be maintained everywhere. Accordingly there are occasional astounding statements which one quotation will serve to exemplify. In the midst of an excellent article on the world to which Jesus came we are first given a somewhat strained and misleading analogy between the state of Palestine then and that of Ireland now, and are then told that "Jesus, as a far-seeing patriot, flung Himself upon the Cross in a desperate effort to save His generation from a kind of corporate suicide . . ."

I have quoted this passage because it serves to introduce the chief weakness of the Commentary. A generalization such as this, which suggests, by implication, a theory of the Passion, would be tolerable only were it set in its proper perspective by a substantial and sufficient enquiry into the whole question of the Suffering of Jesus. For this we look in vain, as also for adequate treatment of the other articles of the Christian Faith. It is true that, given the Creed, every part of it is illustrated, at least in the notes—nay, the origin even of the Mater Dolorosa and the Hail Mary are pointed out!—yet, the Creed *not* being given, there is little to show explicitly how the Scriptures made the formation of such a Creed inevitable.

This failure is further aggravated by a general failure to point the real issue. One of the introductory articles seeks to supply reasons for teaching the Bible. Almost every conceivable reason is given, except the only one which has supreme validity—namely, that upon our answer to the challenge of the Scriptures do our salvation and our eternal life depend. Or again, it is surely true that the Old Testament and the New are given explicit consistence only by the doctrine that Christ who came to redeem Creation is Himself the Agent of Creation. The crux of this doctrine, the Logos Doctrine, is dealt with in half a column. The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel has no commentary! It may be true that the Prologue is out of the depth of school children (though my experience is that they enjoy to hear the Last Gospel at Mass), but it is difficult to see how a teacher is able to place any teaching of Scripture in its right pro-

portion without some guidance as to the implications of the Deity of Christ. And the Commentary is for Teachers, not for their pupils!

If there are few sins of commission, then, there are many sins of omission. It may be wondered, for instance, what will happen to a teacher who overhears something of "form-criticism." He will receive little help from a Commentary which never suggests that the Marcan Order can be reasonably doubted.

It is, however, ungracious to pick holes in a work which had by its nature to err on the side of understatement. It contains several articles for the able lucidity of which others than teachers will be grateful: such articles, for instance, as "The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament" and "The Life and Thought of St. Paul." The latter article in particular makes up for another upon the "Life of the Early Church" in which, under the heading of "Belief," we are not told whether the Early Christians believed in Christ or in the Resurrection!

While recommending this Commentary to all who teach the Bible, a word of warning must be added. There is little of moment that is not mentioned in such a way as to be a pointer to the instructed teacher. But no teaching can be either honest or convincing which continually shelves the vital points because they are controversial. The Bible is not a narcotic: it does not exist to lull spiritually, but to provoke—to belief or disbelief. Unless it can be presented with the authority of revelation that must be accepted or rejected, it cannot be commended merely for its pictures of Semitic life, or even for its secondary purpose of providing material for spiritual experience and meditation, without a strangely unchristian prevarication. In the hands of a teacher himself rooted and grounded in a living faith, this Commentary will prove valuable; used by those who do not yet believe, it is to be feared that it will tend to obscure rather than placard the Gospel.

NOEL DAVEY.

THE WAYS OF CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Dom Cuthbert Butler. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

Men have recently written as though the sixteenth century saw the first attempt to cater for the spiritual development of seculars. This book serves as a valuable corrective. Dom Butler shows very clearly the provision made for this by the old Religious Orders: he includes also St. Teresa and St. Francis de Sales. Perhaps he exaggerates the amount of instruction actually given to those "in the world." St. Gregory may have preached to mixed congregations on contemplative prayer, but mediæval Religious taught them little beyond conversion and penance. The Tertiaries for the most part were scarcely ordinary folk leading ordinary lives.

It would be hard to find a better guide to the old books for spiritual reading than this volume. Dom Butler writes attractively: he outlines briefly the teaching of several great masters of prayer, and indicates where that teaching may most conveniently be obtained; this book has certain other merits. (1) It is the work of a scholar, thoroughly conversant with his subject, and so gives the reader a sense of security. What is more, he again and again introduces him to some unfamiliar book, and allures him to add it to his library. It is important to have a choice of such books. The soul seems to need a change of diet from time to time.

(2) It caters for the busy secular. Dom Butler has all the Benedictine's distaste of extremes and preference for the ordinary. Hence the wisdom of his suggestions for times of prayer and reading, his insistence (with St. Francis) on the "little virtues," his balancing of the claims of private and liturgical prayer, and his upholding the value of vocal prayer.

(3) Many will find it strangely sobering to learn how well our forefathers managed without devotional aids, which today we rightly value; which, indeed, seem to us indispensable—*e.g.*, definite cults of the Blessed Sacrament, of the Blessed Virgin, or even of our Blessed Lord in His incarnate life—to say nothing of devotion to the Sacred Heart or the use of the rosary. Such knowledge makes for a right proportion.

HUBERT NORTHCOTT, C.R.

CATHOLICITY. By H. H. Kelly, S.S.M. S.C.M. Press. 1932. Cloth, 4s.; paper, 2s. 6d.

This book deals with one subject in three different ways. As such it is more a collection of essays than a single treatise. In the first section of the book Fr. Kelly writes of the Catholic party in the Church of England. He has some hard things to say of the "denominational spirit," which in his view has too often been a characteristic of Anglo-Catholic thought and organization. Yet it seems scarcely fair to write as he does of the first Anglo-Catholic Congress in 1920 on p. 28, that "the section did not include any thinkers of eminence, nor, with one or two exceptions, any recognized scholars." Turning up the Report of the 1920 Congress, one finds the names of Dr. Darwell Stone, Professor Turner, Professor Taylor, Fr. Thornton, Dr. N. P. Williams, Dr. Leighton Pullan, to mention only half a dozen. But he goes on to say, "At the congresses, therefore, really able thinkers set out the principles of Catholicity with remarkable carefulness, wisdom, and frankness." What does he mean? If the "section" is so deficient in scholarship, where were the "able thinkers"? Authors far more critical of the Catholic Movement than Fr. Kelly have readily admitted that it enjoys its fair share of the scholarship of the Church.

In the second section of the book he publishes a series of lectures delivered to the Anglican Church in Tokio. These manage to cover in a comparatively small space the whole range of Catholic Theology on Church and Sacraments. It is good that in his chapter on the Eucharist he insists on the danger of separating, in practice and teaching, the ideas of Sacrifice and Communion. Many of the mistakes which have been made in the Catholic Revival in this respect might be remedied if his warning is taken to heart.

The third section is devoted to two chapters on Confirmation and Communion, warmly commended in the preface by the Archbishop of York.

One of the problems of present-day Anglican theology is the relation of Confirmation to Baptism. Fr. Kelly suggests that there is an analogy between this relation and the relation between Good Friday and Pentecost. "The two are separated by fifty days, but they form one whole act." It is right that he should stress the idea that Confirmation is a "receiving of power from on high," rather than an opportunity for instruction. If only some Bishops would help us to realize this in their manner of administering the Sacrament!

Another helpful analogy is the one which he gives, in writing of the relation of General Confession to Sacramental Confession. He compares them with Intercession, public and private. One does not rule out the other; on the contrary, both are needed. Those who wish to see how these analogies are worked out should buy the book.

TREVOR JALLAND.

THE HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-CATHOLIC REVIVAL FROM 1845. By W. J. Sparrow-Simpson. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

It is not easy to give a clear account of the Anglo-Catholic Revival without beginning at 1833, and, indeed, long before that. Dr. Sparrow-Simpson begins in 1845, and accordingly, except in so far as a brief summary can do justice to the Tractarians, has to take much for granted. Within his limits he does well. He illustrates by judicious selections from contemporary documents the Government policy which had the effect of creating an antagonistic Episcopate, the determination of Queen Victoria, Archbishop Tait, and Lord Cairns to read the Prayer Book through Protestant spectacles, and the less prejudiced view taken by outsiders. The best thing in the book is a long chapter on the spiritual independence of the Church, in the course of which he quotes the extremely important evidence given by Bishop Gore before the Royal Commission of 1906.

There are certain omissions. The heresy of Dr. Hampden is assumed on the strength of a verdict of William Palmer. The Gorham controversy is described without any mention of James Mozley's final summary. The handling of the series represented by *Tracts for the Times*, *Lux Mundi*, and *Essays Catholic and Critical* does not go very deep. In fact, the chief result of *Lux Mundi* would seem to have been that it distressed old-fashioned orthodoxy. And there is not a word about the social gospel. Maurice is only mentioned once, and that in connection with his deprecation of any attempt to suppress Catholicism in the interests of Protestantism. There is nothing about Gore, Holland, and the C.S.U.

Of the more external events he gives a very clear and fair-minded account, written from within the movement and cautious in its handling of recent events. A reading of the book would broaden the sympathies of many, but hardly of those who are already Anglo-Catholic. What would it do for them? It would inform them, and teach them in the way wherein they had been going.

S. C. CARPENTER.

CONTEMPORARY CHURCH HISTORY (1900-1925). Orazio M. Premoli. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.

Father Premoli is a Barnabite: member of a Congregation of Clerks Regular, founded in 1530, and centred at first upon the Church of St. Barnabas at Milan. They became famous for the aid which they gave to St. Charles Borromeo in his efforts, as Archbishop of Milan, for the reformation of his diocese: famous also for their devotion to foreign missions and to sacred learning. Father Premoli well sustains the traditions of his Order.

The field, as he says in his preface, is a "vast one": limited, indeed, to the first quarter of the present century, but the more difficult because of the mass of unsorted material, in reports, newspapers, and the like;

and difficult, also, because here, indeed, "the field is the world." But he has the advantage of being enabled to view it from a centre. Rome, in the pontificates of Leo XIII., Pius X., Benedict XV., and Pius XI., provides him with a watch-tower, and from it he is able to describe in succession the work of the Church in all countries, from Europe to Australasia, and from China to Peru. Only the Roman Church, with a centre and no circumference, can include so world-wide a field. We are not Donatists; but a national Church—for all its missions through a world-wide Empire and beyond—cannot rival the Roman Church as an *ecclesia per totum orbem diffusa*. Fr. Premoli has, indeed, a large canvas for his picture.

He has done his survey extremely well—by keeping clear of "religious discussion," "personal opinions," and "encroachment on purely political fields." It is an objective account—giving the facts and making use of the best sources available. And its skill lies in the collection and arrangement of them, coupled with their presentation in readable form.

Fr. Premoli's point of view is candid. On the one hand, it is that of his Church, unyielding, but not, as we too often know it in England, either implacable or sometimes contemptuous. Indeed, we may describe his attitude to us as not unfriendly. He commends the Catholic-minded among Anglicans for their revival of Reservation, and of prayer for the dead, as well as of devotion to our Lady: and, not unfairly, he attributes this partial recovery to familiarity with Catholic religion on the Continent which we gained during the War. Again, he has a just and kindly appreciation of the attempt at reunion made at the conversations of Malines. "The greatest and most sincere cordiality," he writes, "reigned among those who had met together . . . they did not reach an agreement, which, indeed, none of the parties was authorized to conclude, but . . . for the first time in four centuries oral conversations took place with the greatest mutual charity on the points which separate the Catholic and Anglican Churches, between qualified persons on both sides."

That is the most sympathetic and the truest description of our efforts that I have yet seen. For this, we can pardon a certain amount of *Schadenfreude* which betrays itself here and there at the divisions and the ineffectiveness of Anglicanism, but perhaps it is a little premature to say that "the desired union" between Anglican and Orthodox "is still far off." It has certainly moved, though not yet to its goal, since 1925 when Fr. Premoli's book comes to an end.

There are some Anglicans who are in a hurry for reunion and would pay almost any price for it, provided that we are not asked to accept, as a condition of it, what is not historically Catholic. But for all the zeal and devotion recorded in Fr. Premoli's book we have nothing but unreserved admiration.

B. J. KIDD.